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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the cost-production relationship
of trap and hand line fishing in Puerto Rico.

A model of

the fishing family firm is designed which is similar to
the traditional neo-classical model of the fishing industry.

The catch functions, of the Cobb-Douglas type, are

estimated using the single least squares methods.

Tests

of technical efficiency and tests of price efficiency are
then conducted to establish if some groups of fishermen
are more efficient than others and to verify if the fishermen maximize their profit, given the technical coefficients of the catch function and the level of the prices.
The results of those tests show that some fishermen
are significantly more skillful than others.

They also

indicate that, as a rule the fishermen do not maximize
their profit, that is, that they do not choose the optimum
combination of inputs.
Those conclusions suggest a certain number of policy
measures.

It is shown that improving the fishermen's skill

would substantially increase their catch.

The same results

would be obtained if, with proper advice, they selected the
optimum combination of inputs.

Given the lack of sufficient data on the fish population it was not possible to measure the precise extent
of the effects of those policy measures.

However this

study provides a useful guide for the policy makers.
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INTRODUCTION

This study is a cost-production analysis of the two
most important methods of catching fish in the artisanal
fishery of Puerto Rico, namely, hand line fishing and trap
fishing.

The estimation of costs and of returns, in addi-

tion to the description of the economic behavior of the
fishermen, will lead to suggesting policy orientations.
For many years Puerto Rico has been importing most
of its food products including fish.

1

Recently, efforts

have been undertaken to reduce this dependency on outside
suppliers.

In this context the Puerto Rican Department

of Agriculture has initiated various programs

2

to help

the artisanal fisherman.
This study provides the decision makers with information, not otherwise available, concerning the productivity of some fishing methods as well as the economic
behavior of the fishermen.

It shows what can be expected

from a change in the input combinations presently adopted

l

Harvey S. Perloff, Puerto Rico's Economic Future, (The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1950),
PP. 314-316.
2

Rafa~l Pico, Nueva Geografia de Puerto Rico, (Editorial
Universitaria, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1969).

l

2
~y

the fishermen as well as some of the effects which

could result from improving their fishing skills.

These

are tools which will help design the policies necessary
to imorove the economic situation of the fishermen and
to develop the artisanal fishery.
Several approaches were considered.

For the purpose

of policy makinq, a dynamic model would have probably
been more appropriate.

However, insufficient data were

available on the fish population.

In addition, i t would

have been very difficult to obtain information on the
levels of input usea by fishermen for more than one or two
years.

For several inputs the direct interviews were the

only source of data, and, in many occasions, the fishermen
had difficulties remembering their past investments.
Finally, the statistics gathered by the Puerto Rican Department of Agriculture were reliable only after 1969, limiting
possible use of a time series.

For those reasons, it was

decided to use a static model despite the limitations of
such a framework.
The cost-production analysis was conducted for 1972.
From the economic performance and behavior revealed by
this study it was possible to deduce some policy suggestions.
Of

Because of the framework chosen here the effects

those oolicies co11ld not be measured with precision

and it needs to be emnhasized that the results of this part
Of the study should be interpreted with circumsoection.

3

The present chapter gives a description of trap and
hand line fishing in Puerto Rico , showing in Secion I
the importance of the artisan fishery.

In Section II the

attention is more specifically directed toward trap and
hand line fishing.

Finally, Section III summarizes the

various steps of the cost-production analysis.

I
I

4
The Artisan Fishery in Puerto Rico
The economic setting
The artisan fishery represents only a small part of

the Puerto Rican economy.

Yet it is responsible for the

entirety of the local catch.

There is also a tuna fishing

industry, operating mainly out of Mayaguez , but owned by
continental Americans and Japanese.

The tuna is canned in

Puerto Rico and exported to other markets.

These two

sectors of the Puerto Rican fishery are totally independent and to date there are no fishing operations of an
intermediate size between the tuna industry and artisanal
fishery.

Table I-1 compares the artisanal fishery indus-

try with the total economy and the agricultural sector.
As shown in Table I-1 the artisanal fishery employs only
a small amount of the total labor force, and it produces
an even smaller part of the Island income.
The local fishery is one of the less developed sectors
of the economy.

Using the aggregate figures of Table I-1

it is possible to roughly compare the average productivities of labor.

In the total economy it is around $6200

(column I divided by column 4).

In agriculture it is slight-

ly over $3200 while in the fishery it is only about $2000.
The actual difference is even larger since for the fisheries
gross income is used instead of net income.

For the United

TABLE I-1

INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE PUERTO RICAN ECONOMY
AND IN THE ARTISANAL FISHERY
Employment
National
Income ( 1)

Net Income
from Agric. ( 2)

Gross Value of
the Catch (4)

Total
Economy (2) Agric. (2)

(in thousands of dollars)

Artis anal
Fishery(3)

(in thousands)

1970 3,848,000

184,000

1,597

738

74

1

1971 4,296,000

196,000

1,789

755

66

1

1972 4,824,000

211,000

1,930

783

62

1

U1

Sources:

(1)

Department of the Treasury. A Publication of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico Economy and Finances Puerto Rico, 1972, p. 6.

( 2)

Ibid. , p. 7.

(3)

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Agriculture, Status of
Fisheries in Puerto Rico, 1972, by Jose A. Suarez Caabro, Agricultural
and Fisheries Contributions, Vol. V, No. 3, Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico,
p. 47.

(4)

Ibid., p. 48.

6

states as a whole, the same computations give respectively:

$6400 for the total economy, $5500 for agriculture

and $4600 for the fisheries.

3

These are only aggregate

figures and one should be careful when deriving conclusions, yet they emphasize the need to improve the productivity of the Puerto Rican agriculture and especially
that of the fisheries.
At the same time, there is in Puerto Rico an important demand for fish and shellfish and the local catch
represents only 5% of the total consumption.

4

In an

effort to develop the artisanal fishery the government
of the Commonwealth has instituted various loan and credit programs to provide capital for the fishermen.

5

Some of these programs have been operating for more
than ten years.

Still, much remains to be done to improve

the fishing methods and the commercialization of the catch.

3F.

igures computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census StatisTical Abstract of the United States, 1972 (93rd Edition)
Washington, D.C., 1972.
4

Puerto Rico and the Sea, An Action Program for Marine
Atfairs (Preprint) A Report to the Governor, San-Juan,
1972, p. 57.
5

Rafael Pico, Nueva Geografia de Puerto Rico .

7

II

The cultural context
Two monographs on Puerto Rican fishing communities

are apparently the only sociological studies of the artisanal fishery.

One

6

deals with four fishing villages in

southwest Puerto Rico.

The other

7

is based on a survey of

a single village, and includes more interesting detail.
The studies indicate that, as compared with other population groups, the average fisherman had larger families,
was older, and had fewer years of schooling.

8

These

characteristics suggest a traditional society in which
custom and social inertia influence the fishermen's
economic decisions.

The more detailed study 9 confirms

the general impression, but suggests a growing heterogeneity among the group, with more and more fishing family
firms becoming integrated with the market economy.

6

Federico G. Blay, A Study of the Relevance of Selected
Ecological Factors Related to Water Resources and the
Social Organization of Fishing Villages in Puerto Rico.
(Water Resources Research Institute, University of Puerto
Rico, Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, 1972).
7

Irving A. Spaulding, Puerto Rico Fisheries and Mariculture
Development Project (Unpublished Inter Agency Report,
University of Rhode Island, 1974).
8

Blay, The Social Organization of Fishing Villages in
Puerto Rico.
9

spaulding, Puerto Rico Fisheries and Mariculture
Development Project.

8

The incomes of the fishermen reflect this to some
extent.

Ninety -one percent of the fishermen, and 55 per-

cent of the non-fishermen have annual incomes in the $1000 $3999 range, while 30 percent of the fishermen and 27.3
percent of the others have incomes between $4000 -

$5999.

This suggeststhat a few fishermen are earning fairly good
incomes.

At the same time none of the fishermen, but 18.2

percent of the non-fishermen, have incomes less than $1000.
The traditional character of the fishery is also revealed by the fact that "in general, the part-time fishermen and the non-fishermen· showed a somewhat more prevalent
tendency than did the full-time fishermen for continuing
to work at a different job if their current occupation
could no longer be followed

(in that situation)

47.8 per-

cent of the full-time fishermen and 41.7 percent of the nonfishermen indicated that they would not work".

10

This is

further emphasized by the fishermen's justifications for
not working if they could not fish any longer.

Forty-two

point seven percent indicated that they knew nothing else,
while only 22.2 percent of the non-fishermen justified their
. t h.is way. 11
a nswer in

lO_Ibid., p. 16
11

.

Ibid ' Table lSb .

9

From those observations it appears that the artisanal
fishery in Puerto Rico is still largely traditional, and
that most of the fishermen are not fully integrated into
the market economy.
While some fishermen are modernizing their operations
and introducing new techniques of fishing or of management,
most of them are still attached to the traditional methods.

10
II

Trap and Hand Line Fishing
As shown in Table I-2,

together, trap and hand line

fishing are responsible for nearly 60 percent of the total
landings.

Hand line fishing is practiced all around the

island, while trap fishing is more concentrated in some
areas.

Of the 8,105 traps reported in 1972, 3,160 (39 per-

cent) cou ld be found on the West Coast while only 224
percent) belonged to fishermen on the North Coast.

(2.8

12

In Puerto Rico the most common fish trap is the
arrow-head typP.. They are made of chicken wire around a
frame of either mangrove wood or iron rods.

"Normally, it

is fishe d in shallower depth (less than twenty fathoms) because of the lack of mechanical hauling

equipment'~. 13

In addition, the boats have no navigation equipment to aid
the captain in finding his traps.

Land marks are used

which_is very inefficient as soon as it is misty or foggy.
On fishing grounds known for their high productivity there

12

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture,
Status o f Fisheries in Puerto Rico, 1972 by Jose A.
Suarez Caabro, Agricultural and Fisheries Contributions,
Vol. V, No . 3, Caba Rojo, Puerto Rico, p. 47.
13

Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico Departamento
de Agricultura, A Report of Exploratory Fishing and
Gear Tests in Puerto Rico from 1969 to 1972 by Rolf
Suhl Contri buciones Agropecuarias y Pesqueras Vol. IV,
No. 3, Caba Rojo Puerto Rico , p. 5.

11
TABLI: I-2
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CATCH OF FISH AND SHELLFISH
BY FISHING GEAR IN PUERTO RICO IN 1972

PERCI:NT

GEAR

(of the total catch)
41

Fish Pot
Spiny Lobster Pot
Beach Seine
Gill Net

less than 1
11
8

Hand Line

17

Troll Line

11

Spear

2

Trot Line
By Hand

1

Cast Net

Source:

8

less than 1

Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, Departamento
de Agricultura, A Report on Fisheries Statistics
Program in Puerto Rico from 1967 to 1972, by Rolf
Juhl and Jose A. Suarez Caabro Agricultural and
Fisheries Contributions, Vol. IV, No. 4, San Juan
Puerto Rico, p. 22.

12
are often a very large number of traps and sometimes it is
necessary to navigate carefully to avoid cutting the ropes
tying the buoys to the traps.

Generally, the fish pots

are not deliberately baited but sometimes the fishermen
will leave inside some fish which are too small to sell or
for which there is no demand.
Hand line fishing "while requiring a small investment
requires considerable more ability and knowledge of fish
habits 11
lines

14
•

In this type of fishing the fishermen use long

(300 to 500 feet).
At the end of the line 4, 6, 8 hooks are
hung from a hard frame of galvanized wire,
with a three 1
five pound lead attached to
the center 11 •
11

50

Those hooks are baited with small fish which the fishermen
catch with their cast nets.

When fishing with hand lines,

some of the fishermen will let the
are on the fishing grounds.

boat ~

drift once they

Others prefer to keep the boat

still, and in some areas there will be one man in the boat
whose sole task is to steer the boat while the others are
fishing.

14

Study of the Fisheries Potential of the Virgin Islands,
Special Report, Caribbean Research Institute Contribution,
No . 1 Virgin Island Ecological Research Station, August,
1969, p. 41.
15

Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico Departamento de
Agricultura Contribuciones Agropecuarias y Pesqueras, Vol.
II, No. 1, San Juan Puerto Rico, p. 28.

13
In areas where conditions are suitable for trap and
hand line fishing many fishermen practice both methods.
There is a significant difference between the species
c aught by traps and the species caught by lines.

The

l a r ges t s o urce of revenue

from traps is lobster (35.5 per16
c ent nf the total value of the catch from traps in 1971) .
Bu t, l obsters aside, the difference in the species composition of the fin-fish catch from traps and hand lines is
i mpor t a nt .
While the weight of the fish caught with traps is 60
pe rce n t larger than the weight of the landing from lines,
t his d i fference is reduced in value to 22 percent.

(Table I-3).

Even taking into account lobsters in 1971, the average price
per pound of fish and shellfish caught by traps was 36¢
.
17
agai. n st 44¢ for hand lines.

For hand lines 50 percent of

landi ng s were silk snappers which sold for more than 60¢ a
pound.

Still, trap fishing is more common probably for

the reasons mentioned earlier regarding the ability and
k nowl e dge required to use hand lines effectively.

16

Commowealth of Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture,
Status o f Fisheries in Puerto Rico, 1971 by Rolf Juhl and
J~se A. Suarez Caabro Agricultural and Fisheries Contributions, Vol . IV, No. 1 San Juan Puerto Rico, p. 45.
17

.

~-, pp.

45-46.

TABLE I-3
COMPARISON OF THE CATCH COMPOSITION FROM TRAPS
AND HAND LINES IN 1971

Quantity
(lbs)

Tra,es
% of
Total

Value
$

% of
Total

Grunt

300,000

26.3

70,091

19

Grouper

212,400

18.7

68,404

Silk Snapper

100,316

8.8

All Snapper
182,122
(including
silk snapper)

16

Total Fish
Caught

Source:

206,200
1,138,170

Hand Lines
% of
Value
Total
$

% of
Total

8,300

1. 2

2,324

.7

18.6

100,000

14.5

53,000

10.9

61,357

16.6

230,084

33.3

151,462

50.

107,857

29.3

223,323

32.3

228,329

75.4

I

Porgy
Goat Fish

I

Quantity

18.l
100

50,357

t-'
.i:..

I

80,000

I

691,497

11. 6

19,849

6.6

13.7

368,118 100

303,366

100

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Agriculture, Status of Fisheries
in Puerto Rico, 1971 by Rolf Juhl and Jose A. Suarez Caabro, Agricultural
and Fisheries Contributions, Vol. IV, No. 1, San Juan, Puerto Rico, pp. 45-46.

15

The different composition of the catches can be partly
explained by the behavior and in particular the feeding
The traps catch bottom

habits of the various species.

feeders such as grunts which, when they are young "feed
primarily on the animals of the plankton within a few feet
of the bottom.

These food habits are retained to a large

degree by the adults

(of some species)

11

18
•

A similar explanation applies to the goatfish which
"live in close association with sand or mud bottoms ...
The food consists primarily of a great variety of small
invertebrate animals, many of which normally live beneath
the surface of the sand or mud 11

19
•

In contrast porgies "do not seek shelter in reefs but
rely on keeping a considerable distance between themselves
and a potential source of danger".

20

This explains why they

are not found in the fish traps.
As for the silk snappers, the majority are caught with
hand lines because they are "a deeper-water species than
most,

(it is often found between)

300 and 800 feet".

18c

21

.
aribbean Reef Fishes, John E. Randall (Jersey City:
T.F . H. Publications, Inc., 1968), p. 128.
19Ib'

~-'

20

p. 153.

.
~-' p. 141.

21 .
B Fishes of the Bahamas and Adjacent Tropical Waters,
Ohlke and Chaplin (Wynnewood:
Livingston Publishing
Company, 1968), p. 351.

16
III

The Different Steps of the Analysis
Chapter II provides a detailed description of the

areas surveyed.

Each of the communities visited are des-

cribed, and their degree of representativeness of the
various coasts is discussed.

In addition the composi-

tion of the sample is presented here and some characteristics of the group of fishermen interviewed are explained.
Chapter III reviews the latest neo-classical models
of the fishing industry but earlier articles are of ten
mentioned for their contributions.

Although the models

often dealt with the industry, i t was possible to use
their approach to analyze the firm's behavior.

It was also

necessary, however to refer to more practical works where
catch functions had been estimated for various fisheries.
They provided examples of the variables which were most
often chosen to explain the catch, as well as various means
to measure some of these inputs.
The econometric problems raised by the estimation of
the catch function also needed to be examined.
A long
.
22
series of articles, starting with Marschak and Andrew's

22
.Jacob Marschak and William H. Andrews, Jr., "Random
Simultaneous Equations and the Theory of Production,"
Econometrica, 12 (July/October, 1944).

17
offered various ways of estimating production functions
in general.

Furthermore, they emphasized some properties

of those various approaches, which could be used to measure
management.
In addition to reviewing articles on the economics
of the fishing industry, Chapter III surveys the more
technical works where catch functions were estimated and
the articles dealing with econometric problems inherent
to this kind of study.
The theoretical model is displayed in Chapter IV.
The latest developments of the nee-classical model on the
fishing industry are introduced to devise a framework
suitable to analyze trap fishing and hand line fishing.
Perfect competition is assumed throughout the study.
A method is proposed to estimate the catch function
and to conduct various statistical tests concerning the
economic behavior of the fishermen, particularly to see
if profit is maximized.
The synthesis of the various levels of research
undertaken up to then starts with Chapter V.

The the-

oretical model and the data gathered in Puerto Rico are
combined to estimate catch functions.

The need to con-

ciliate the logic of the model and the limits imposed
by the data collected led to computing many regressions.

18
several measures of the same variables WP.re often available but due to the practical difficulties of estimating
them, a priori, none could be preferred.

Chapter V

exposes the advantages and drawbacks for the various variables and it shows the regressions obtained when using
those different measures.

In some cases the low signi-

2
ficance of the regressions (R ) leads to rejecting some
of the possibilities.

However, the quality of the va-

rious regressions is very often, quite comparable and
several of them can be regarded as very satisfactory.
This makes it possible to avoid a choice between those
equations

in the subsequent chapters some of which will

be more useful according to the type of analysis conducted.
Chapter V only describes the catch function.

Chapter

VI analyzes the behavior of the fishermen in more detail.
To test for differences in technical efficiency among
groups of fishermen, other regressions are computed.

Assu-

ming that all the groups of fishermen have the same catch
function, except for the possibility of different technical
efficiencies, a dummy variable is introduced to account for
this effect.

When the coefficient of this variable is signi-

ficantly different from zero the groups do not have the same
technical efficiency.

19
Tests were then conducted to see if the fishermen
are price efficient, that is, if they choose the optimum
combination of inputs given the set of input
prices.

and output

This test is first conducted for all the trap

fishermen as one group and for all the line fishermen as
another.

Later on, sub-groups are defined, using the same

criteria as the ones already selected when dividing the
fishermen to test for technical efficiency.

The tests

of price efficiency are conducted again, this time to see
if there are differences in the price efficiencies of the
various sub-groups.
The various findings concerning technical and price
efficiencies lead, in Chapter VII, to propose some policy
orientations which could be chosen to improve the profits
of the fishermen.

However, before making those suggestions,

and in order to be able to compare the possible effects of
those policies to the present situation, some time is devoted to present some of the economic performances of the
fishermen.

Since the chapters have analyzed their behavior,

it is now possible to show the results of those practices
and to compare them to what may happen if they are changed.
The limitations of the comparative static framework are
recalled and emphasized.

Given those warnings, the direct-

ion of changes to be expected from several possible policy
measures are analyzed.
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A conclusion summarizes the various results.

It

emphasizes the need for futher research and suggests some
avenues which should be explored.

II

THE PUERTO RICAN FISHING GROUNDS
AND THE AREAS SURVEYED

One of the reasons explaining the relatively low
development of the Puerto Rican fisheries is the limited
number of productive banks around the island.
In this chapter the Island's coast is divided into
four areas which are desc r ibed successively.

In addition,

more specific details are presented for the communities
surveyed on each of the coasts.
In order to be able to generalize the results of the
study to the whole Island, a survey was conducted in six
municipalities chosen for their representativeness for
trap or hand line fishing or both.

Of those six munici-

palities, one, Arecibo, is situated on the North Coast; two,
Aguadilla and Cabo Rojo are on the West Coast;
Guanica and Salinas are on the South Coast;
Naguabo, is on the East Coast.

two others,

and one,

Before describing those

municipalities it must be noted that in the municipality

Of Cabo Rojo, six fishing villages were surveyed, while in
each of the other municipalities only one fishing community
Was included in the study.

Differences between the six

villages of Cabo Rojo suggested that important additional
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information would be obtained by studying all of them,
while in each of the other municipalities the various
fishing communities were quite similar.
The representativeness of the sample is suggested
by the figures in Table II-1.

In 1972, the fish caught

in the six municipalities represented 51 percent of the
total value landed in Puerto Rico.
cent of the

In addition, 35 per-

R:terto Rican fishermen lived in those six

areas.
The number of personal interviews conducted in each
of the municipalities is shown in Table II-2.
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TABLE II-1
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PORTS SURVEYED
AND COMPARISON WITH THE REST OF THE ISLAND.
Quantity
Value
Fishermen No. of No .of No .of
landed lbs. landed $
Boats Traps Lines
( 1)

(2 )

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

North Coast
Arecibo

301,100
42,429

170,842
30,179

292
42

198
32

224
12

289
96

West Coast
Cabo Rojo
Aguadilla

1,627,799
1,111,322
322,145

624,763
402,090
114,922

27 5
111
69

247
93
58

3160
2649
102

219
112

South Coast
Salinas
Guanica

431,279
106,830
137,201

214,145
61,965
63,586

245
48
47

211
38
39

2464
499
296

117
12
18

1,321,290
311,334

564(034
133,512

156
19

141
17

2257
343

137
14

Island Totals 3,681,468 1,573,784

968

797

8105

762

Total in areas
surveyed
2,031,261

806,254

336

277

3901

296

51 %

35%

35%

48%

39%

East Coast
Naguabo

% of the island

Source:

55%
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Columns (1) to (5): Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Department of Agriculture.
Status of Fisheries in
Puerto Rico, 1972 by Jose A. Suarez-Caabro. Agricultural and Fisheries Contributions Vol. V No. 3
Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico p. 47.
Column (6} Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico.
Departmento de Agricultura Contribuciones Agropecuarias y Pesqueras. Vol II, No. 1. San Juan,
Puerto Rico. p.27.

TABLE II-2

NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS PER MUNICIPALITY
IN 1973-74

Intended
Sample size

Men not
fishing
anymore

Refused
to
answer

Actual number
of
responses

Cabo Rojo

41

6

Aguadilla

8

l

l\.recibo

11

2

Naguabo

9

4

5

Salina

10

4

6

Guanica

11

2

9

80

19

Total

1

14*
7

l

2

8

50

*In addition 17 had no sale tickets and 3 did not fish with lines nor traps.
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The North Coast

1

General Characteristics
considering that the richest marine life develops in

waters less than 100 fathoms deep, it is significant to
note that on the North Coast the 100 fathom limit is no
more than one or two miles from the shore.

This explains

why along that coast there is little fishing and that
very few fishermen there use fish traps.

Instead they

use various kinds of lines, mainly hand lines and troll
lines.

In addition, the weather is often rough and the

currents are strong making it difficult for the fishermen
to go out often.

Finally the coast line offers few pro-

tected areas which could be used as harbours.

In many

places the cliffs are high and it is often difficult to
reach the sea.

For all those reasons,

"This area only produced 8% of the total
landings, ... In 1972, 301,000 pounds of
fish and shellfish were taken in the north
coast.
The average ex-vessel price per
pound was $.56. This was the lowest fish
production of the island and conversely,
it was the area whe2e the highest price
,,;as paid for fish".

1

Much of the information concerning the geographical
characteristics of the various areas and derived from
Ra~ael ~ico, Nueval Geografia du Puerto Rico (Editorial
Universitaria.
Universidad de Puerto Rico , 1969).
2

c::-Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Agriculture,
~tatus of Fisheries in Puerto Rico, 1972, by Jose A.
Vu~res-caabro, Agricultural and Fisheries Contributions,
0
• V, No. 3, Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico, p. 37.

27

This last remark can be explained to a large extent by the
high proportion in the catch of fish with a high price per
pound (Snappers) rather than by different market characteristics. 3

Finally, it should be noted that during a

large part of the year when the sea conditions do not allow
fishing trips many fishermen frequently use haul seines at
the mouth of the rivers.
The municipality chosento represent the North Coast
was Arecibo.
II

Arecibo
Most of the fishermen live in barrios outside of this

large

to~n.

As with most of the fishermen on the North

Coast their most common fishing technique is hand line
fishing.

For this they use boats which are between 16 and

18 feet with motors between 16 and 20 horsepowers.

3

Ibid

----..;.•t

p. 13
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II
I

The West Coast
General Characteristics
The characteristics of part of the west coast are

similar to those of the north coast.

To the north of

Anasco the continental shelf is also very narrow and
consequently few fishermen use fish traps in that area.
They use hand lines and, particularly in Aguadilla, they
also have troll lines with which they catch tuna.
To the south of Mayaguez the continental shelf is
wider, the 100 fathom line going as far as 17 miles
from the shore.

Here are found some of the riches

fishing grounds in Puerto Rico .

Various types of gear

are used by the fishermen and some of the most successful
fishermen, by Puerto Rican standards, fish off the southern part of the west coast.

Puerto Real , in Cabo Rojo, is

the most important fishing port of the island.

One should

also mention the presence of large mangrove areas in and
around the bay of Boqueron (Cabo Rojo) where the fishermen
catch mangrove oysters.

In fact, Boqueron is the largest

center for the production of oysters in Puerto Rico.
"The west coast produced 44% of the
landings in 1972 ... A total of 1,628,000
pounds of fish and shellfish were landed
with an average ex-vessel price per pound
of $.39. This was th~ lowest recorded
price on the island".

4

.

~-, p. 39.
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There too, the composition of the catch is largely
responsible for the low price of the fish.

Using traps

the fishermen catch a lot of low priced goatfish.
Two municipalities were surveyed on this coast,
Cabo Rojo and Aguadilla.
II

Cabo Rojo
Cabo Rojo is situated at the south western end of

the island.

Because of the wide continental shelf and

the numerous bays i t is a region
fishing industry.

very favorable to the

Six communities of the fishermen are

found in that municipality:

Puerto Real, El Combate,

Bahia Sucia, Boqueron, Joyuda, and Guanajibo:

Interviews

were conducted with a number of fishermen in each of
those communities.
Puerto Real is the most important fishing port in
Puerto Rico.

Most of the boats used here are 28 to 32

feet long with inboard engines and a sail, and the majority are equipped with mechanical pot haulers.

The

fishermen primarily fish with traps and hand lines although a few own or use other kinds of fishing gear.
With their large boats many fishermen are able to go
far off shore and take advantage of the wide continental
shelf.

Some even fish off Mona

to the southwest of Mayaguez.

Island which is 50 miles
In that case they often

leave for a week and establish a base on the island from
Which they go fishing every day.

TABLE II-3

NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS IN EACH COMMUNITY
OF CABO ROJO

Intended
Sample
Size
Puerto Real

12

Men
not
fishing
anymore
2

Men
without
sale
tickets

Refused
to
answer

Men not
fishing
with traps
or lines

5

Actual
Number
of
responses
5

w
0

El Combate

12

2

4

Bahia Sucia

10

2

5

Boqueron

3

2

Joyuda

2

1

Guanajibo

2

Total

41

2

3

1
1
1

6

17

4

1

1
3

14
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In Puerto Real there are three dealers who buy t h e
fish from the fis he rmen.

These dealers play an important

role in the economic life of the community.

In addition

to buying the fish, t h ey also provide gas and ice to the
fishermen and at lea s t one of them owns several boats
for which he hires captains.

As part of the contract

the captains fishing on the dealer's boats receive a lower
price per pound for the fish caught.

Although this situa-

tion is not unique to Puerto Real it is quite rare in the
other fishing ports.
There are few other economic activities in Puerto
Real besides fishing.

There are a small number of tourists

and some fishermen combine their fishing activities with
providing boat rides particularly to Mona Island.
In El Combate one finds this same combination of
fishing and tourism, although the latter activity is more
important here than in Puerto Real.

The fishermen of El

Cornbate can be divided in two groups according to the
size of their operation.

Some have large and powerful

boats as in Puerto Real.

Those men fish mainly with traps

and hand lines, and their boats are often equipped with
pot haulers.

The other group owns smaller boats with less

powerful, outboard motors.

These fishermen often used

several types of gear (various types of nets in particular)
besides the fish pots and hand lines.
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In

El Combate, too, the fish is sold to dealers none

of whom seem to have the economic power of the dealers
of Puerto Real.
Bahia Sucia is situated on the southern coast but
it is still in the municipality of Cabo Rojo.
is the most important activity in this village.

Fishing
Here

the boats are smaller than in Puerto Real or El Combate
(12 to 16 feet).

This village presents the largest diver-

sity of gears used;

every kind of net or line used in

Puerto Rico can be found in Bahia Sucia.
fishing is the most common method.

Still, trap

Since April 1973

fishing activity has been hampered by an oil spill off
the coast.

One of the consequences of this accident was

the formation of an association of the fishermen initially
for the sole purpose of representing their interests, but
which is now providing other services including marketing
of practically the whole catch of Bahia Sucia.
Boqueron is situated between Puerto Real and El
Cornbate.

Tourism is one of the main economic resources

here, but there is also some fishing, especially for
mangrove oysters.

Few fishermen of Boqueron use traps

or lines and most do not catch anything besides oysters.
Guanajibo and Joyuda are two small villages to the
south of Mayaguez.

Few fishermen were reported in either
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of these two places.

The fishermen surveyed in Guanajibo

were operating large boats as in Puerto Real and also
fishing with both traps and hand lines.

In Joyuda, on

the contrary, most fishermen have smaller boats, much like
those in Bahia Sucia and fish primarily with traps.
Some general patterns can be isolated for Cabo Rojo
as a whole.

There are two classes of fishermen, some with

big boats, others with small boats, but whatever the size
of their boats in all the villages, the fishermen favor
fishing with traps.

In addition, some fish with hand lines,

and, most of the time, whether they own other types of gear
or not, trap fishing and hand line fishing are their most
important sources of landings.
II

Aguadilla
Aguadilla is situated in a bay, on the west coast

to the north of Mayaguez.

In that area the continental

shelf does not extend very far and consequently there is
little trap fishing out of Aguadilla.
ly use lines:

The fishermen main-

troll lines and hand lines.

Usually their

boats are between 16 and 18 feet but since the waves are
bigger here than in the south
curved from front to back.

the bottom of the boat is

This type of boat, which or-

ginated here but which is also used all along the north
coast, is referred to as the "yola J>.guadilla."
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The motors are often powerful for this size of: boat;
20 to 25 horsepower is not uncommon.

The fishermen say

that they need such motors because of the type of fishing
they do (troll lines) and because of the rough weather.
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III
I

The South Coast
General Characteristics
Along the south coast the continental shelf is not

very wide except from Guayama to Ponce.

Yet, almost

everywhere, it is large enough so that the fishermen can
practice trap fishing along with line fishing .

One of

the problems facing the fishing industry along the south
coast is the competition with other industries for the
use of the shore line.

This is particularly so around Ponce

and Guanica where there are refineries and chemical plants.
Besides being a potential source of pollution, these industries are responsible for much of the maritime traffic along
the south coast.

At times, this creates a problem for the

fishermen who lose their traps because the buoy lines are
cut by the merchant ships.
"In 1972, 431,000 pounds of fish and shellfish
were landed (on the south coast).
T§e average
ex-vessel price per pound was $.48."
Salinas and Guanica were surveyed as representative of the
South Coast.
II

Salinas
One could say of Salinas that it is the average fish-

ing port of Puerto Rico.

5 Ib'

~.,

p. 37.

It is a small town of the southern
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coast situated in a bay which offers good protection to the
small boats.

The continental shelf is not very wide here

but it is sufficient to allow trap fishing.
have around 40 to 50 traps.

Most fishermen

The boats are usually 16 to 18

feet long.
III

Guanica
Guanica was the last community surveyed.

Here too

the fishermen use traps but in fewer numbers than in the
other ports.
traps.

Most of the fishermen own only 20 or 30

The boats and motors too are usually smaller than

in the rest of the island.

This is probably related to the

fact that most fishermen go fishing alone in their boats.
In none of the other communities visited is this a common
practice.
In one of the barrios where the fishermen live, some
condominiums and summer houses are now being built.

This

presently provides jobs to some fishermen and is a welcomed
second source of income.

However, many of the fishermen

interviewed resent the development of tourism in that area.
They view it as an infringement of their freedom.
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IV
I

The East Coast
General Characteristics
Finally, the east coast is, with the west coast,

the mo st favorable for fishing.

Here the continental

sh e l f i s very large (1500 square miles) and the depth is
never beyond 40 fathoms.

6

The weather is usually more

clement t han along the other coasts and, in addition, there
are nume r o us small bays which provide natural harbours.
Many f i s hermen who live on the main Island go fishing around
the small er i s lands of Vieques and Culebra.

The fishermen

of the e as t coast are practically the only ones using lobster pots.

They also use many fish traps .

This type of

fishing is very well adapted to the natural conditions on
this coast.
"This (region) ranks second among Puerto Rico's
f i s heries area .
In 1972, a total of 1,321,000
pounds of fish and shellfish were landed with
an average ex-vessel price of $.43 per pound .
Th i s area produced 36 percent of the total landings of Puerto Rico". 7
Naguabo wa s the municipality studied on the East Coast.
II Naquabo
Na guabo was chosen to represent the east coast.

It

6

Rafael P i co, Nueva Geografia de Puerto Rico, p. 145.
7

S~ommonwea lth of Puerto Rico. Department of Agriculture
C-atus of Fi s heries in Puerto Rico 1972, by Jose A. Suarez
Naabro Agricultural and Fisheries Contributions Vol. V,
0
• 3_, Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico, p. 39.

38

is one of the largest fishing centers on that side of
the Island.

The continental shelf extends quite far here

and consequently trap fishing is the most common way of
fishing.

The boats are bigger (18-24 feet) and the engines

more powerful (25-40 horsepower) than in most other places.
The fishermen also have more traps than in many other centers;

100 to 200 traps is not uncommon.
The traps are frequently laid all the way from

Naguabo to the island of Culebra which is situated 20 miles
east of Naguabo.

In those cases the fishermen may go lift

some traps, stay in Culebra overnight, and come back the
next day while lifting more traps.

Despite the fact that

the fishermen of that area own many traps only two of them
have mechanical pot haulers.
In Naguabo one of the big problems faced by the fishermen is the loss of traps.

There is a considerable marine

traffic around the areas where the traps are laid and often
the ropes tying the buoys to the fish pots are cut.

For

some fishermen the number of traps lost in 1972 was close
to half the number of the traps they keep in the water.
Finally, in all the communities surveyed only the
fishermen of Puerto Real and some in El Combate brought ice
With them on the fishing trip.

Usually these trips are not

Very long, and in Arecibo some fisher~en fish at night.
Still, there is little doubt that the quality of the fish
Would be much improved if better care was taken of the catch.
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VI

Desc r iption of the Sampl e
Tab l e II - 4 summarizes part of the information and

g i ve s s ome indications concerning other aspects of the fishi ng f a mi l y firms in the different communities.

A word of

c a ution i s necessary when interpreting the average number of
trap fish ing days or line fishing days.

When this number is

low it usually means that only 1 or 2 fishermen practice this
method o f fishing.

It is less often the case that many

fisherme n will practice one method most of the year and the
other on e a few days a

ye~r.

In Tab le II-5 and Table II-6 the sample is divided
into homo ge neo us subsets according to the power of the boats .
Tabl e II - 5 concerns the fishermen fishing with traps ,
while Table I I -6 gives the same information for those fish ing with l ine s.
The data show that, in general, the large boats go to
sea more o f te n .

Their annual revenue, from traps and lines

combined, reflects this behavior.

This is to be expected :

the owners of large boats have to finance greater investments.
This comp aratively large investment is not only due to the
boat and its motor but also to the fact that they fish more
traps and u s e mechanical winches.
Another important finding is that most fishermen fish
mainly with either traps or with lines.

As a general rule

they do n o t divide their time equally between both methods.

-
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TABLE II-4
CHARACTERISTICS OF FISHING FAMILY FIRMS IN THE
AREAS SURVEYED
Cabo Rojo
Total number of
captains surveyed

Aquadilla

Arecibo

14

7

8

Boats wit:h motor
<30 hp

7

1

0

Boats wi th motor
>30 hp

7

6

8

Average length of
the boats in ft.

21.1

17.7

16.9

Average power of
the motor in hp

46.8

21.3

18.9

Average number of
traps owned

78.4

8.4

0

Average number of
men in the boat

1.9

2.1

2.1

Average number of
trap fishing days
a year

114.2

Average number of
line fishing days
a year

3.2

49.3

123

Net average annual
revenue from trap

7933.1

356.6

0

Net average annual
revenue from line

324.1

1412.77

7

0

Number of fishermen
using a winch
Source:

10

0

2066.4

Data obtained by the author during a field survey
1973-1974 of 50 ~ishermen

0
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TABLE II-4

(continued)

CHARACTERISTICS OF FISHING FAMILY FIRMS IN THE
AREAS SURVEYED
Naguabo

Salinas

Guanica

Total number of
captains surveyed

5

7

9

Boats with motor
>30 hp

3

1

0

Boats with motor
<30 hp

2

6

9

Average length of
the boats in ft.

19.6

16.7

16.3

Average power of
the motor in hp

31. 2

23.l

10.4

41.7

25.4

1.7

1.1

Average number of
traps owned
Average number of
men in the boat

103

2.2

Average number of
trap fishing days
a year

156

Average number of
line fishing days
a year

0

Net average annual
revenue from trap

10553.1

130

112

0.2

0.2

4523.2

1548.2

Net average annual
revenue from line

0

7.1

0.4

Number of fishermen
using a winch

1

1

3

Source:

Data obtained by the author during a field survey
1973-1974 of 50 fishermen

42
TABLE II-5
CHARACTERISTICS OF TRAP FISHING ENTERPRISE S
ACCORDING TO THE POWER OF ENGINES

Motor
>30HP

Motor
$ 30HP

Motor
>40HP

Total number of boats

12

38

6

44

Boats used for trap
fishing

12

27

6

33

Boats used for trap
and line fishing

5

4

4

5

Average length of
the boats (ft)

23.5

16.6

27.8

17.0

Average power of
the motor (HP)

60.4

15.3

80.8

19.8

Average number of
traps owned

89.5

41.4

132.3

52.1

Average number of
men in the boat

2.2

1.6

2.2

1. 7

Average number of trap
fishing days in a year

100.1

76.1

126.8

Average number of line
fishing days in a year

3.8

2.5

5.5

Net annual revenue
from traps

10,854

3,139

14,506

Net annual revenue
from lines

435.8

54.1

745.7

Number of fishermen
using a winch

7

3

5

Motor
<40HP

76
2.5
2662
67.1
5

Source: Field survey of 30 fishermen, 1973-74 and Department of Agriculture sale tickets for the period.
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TABLE II-6
CHARACTERISTICS OF LINE FISHING ENTERPRISES
ACCORDING TO THE POWER OF THE ENGINE

Motor Motor
> 3 0 HP < 3 0 HP

Number of boats sampled

Motor

Motor

> 4 0 HP

< 4 0 HP

12

38

6

44

Boats used for line fishing

5

15

4

16

Boats used for trap and
line fishing

5

4

4

5

Average length of boat (Ft.) 26.4

16.8

28.3

16.9

Average Power of the
motor (HP)

75.2

19.0

84.0

20.3

Average number of men in
the boat

2.0

2.0

2.0

2.0

Average number of trapfishing days in a year

117.6

6.7

146.8

6.4

Average number of line
fishing days in a year

9.2

66.1

8.3

62.8

250.1 ],9006.0

239.7

Net annual revenue from
traps
Net annual revenue from
lines

15,219.3

1,045.8 1,718.86 1118.86 1658.3

Source: Field survey of 20 fishermen, 1973-74 and
Department of Agriculture sale tickets for the period.
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This may be due to the preference of the fishermen, but it
also reflects the natural conditions around the ports where
the fishermen live.

This tends to be confirmed by the fact

that all the large boats were found in areas of trap fishing (see Table II-4) where they are used for that type of
fishing.

In addition, larger boats are able to go to or

beyond the edge of the continental shelf where most line
fishing takes place.
Table II-7 shows that most of the boats have two
men on board.

This class of boats is also the one which

goes to sea more often (122.2 days between line fishing
and trap fishing) .

This is probably one of the reasons

why it is the most successful economically with the
average annual income by far the highest.

The characte-

ristics (length and power) of the boats with two men is
very similar to the characteristics of the boats with
three men, while the boats with one man are, on the average
smaller and less powerful.
Most of the boats with three men are used for line
fishing exclusively or in combination with trap fishing. On
the contrary the boats with only one man are often used exclusively for trap fishing.

During the interviews it appeared

that many of the fishermen fishing alone seemed older than
the others.

Although their age was not recorded.

ce P t ion
·
must be noted, however.

One ex-

It was mentioned earlier that
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TABLE II-7
CHARACTERISTICS OF FISHING ENTERPRISESACCORDING
TO THE NUMBER OF MEN ON BOARD
Total Boats with Boats with Boats with
sample one man
two men
three men
on board
on board
on board
Number of boats

50

14

30

6

Boats used for trap
fishing

39

12

23

3

Boats used for hand
line fishing

20

3

13

4

Boats used for trap and 9
hand line fishing

1

6

1

Average length of the
boats (ft)

18.3

16.5

19.03

19.2

Average power of the
engine (HP)

26.78

11. 86

32.43

33.3

Average number of
traps owned

44.2

24.3

56.3

30.0

Average number of trap 87.1
fishing days in a year

92.8

93.7

40.9

Average number of line 27.7
fishing days in a year

10.1

28.5

64.1

Annual revenue from 4859.03
traps and hand lines
Number of boats equip- 11
Ped with a winch

Source:

2918.96

62~9 . 53

4049.19

4

7

0

Data obtained by the author during a field survey
·1973-1974 of 50 fis~ermen
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in Gu anica , many of the fishermen were alone in their
boats r egardless of their age.
Fr om the present data it is not possible to deduce
that o ne of the classes of boats is more traditional than
t h e oth e r .

The boats with only one man have a lower annual

income a nd go at sea less often .

However, the fact than one

third of t ho se fishing with traps in that class are equipped
with a winch tend to indicate that those boats are owned by
fishermen who are open to technical inovations .

(Only 11

boats out o f the 39 fishing with traps in the whole sample
have a winch) .

The difference between the performance of

the various type s of firms, particularly between those using
more power f ul b o ats and those using le s s powerful boats,
suggest that ma ny factors influence the catch of the fishermen.
An econometric analysis of the data based on a theoretical mode l o f the fishing family firm will show the rela tive impor t a n c e o f the various inputs.
A prior i , Table II-7 does not provide any reason t o
suspect t hat the economic behavior of the f ishemen varies
from one c la s s o f boats to another .

III

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The model of the fishing enterprise should show the
costs of production as well as the returns to the firms.
For the fishing industry and necessarily for the firm, the
analysis must recognize the effects of fishing effort on
the stock.

Thus, a catch function which takes into ac-

count the effects of fishing effort on the growth of the
fish population must be established.

In the case of a

static framework, which is what will be developed here,
some notion of the biological equilibium at a given level
of effort must be answered.
Various models of the fishing industry have been
developed which deal with various degrees of success with
the special problems associated with a fish growth function
which is affected by so called fishing externalities.
These models all have the form of a system of equations
showing the relationship between the level of the catch,
the cost and the fish population growth.
After the presentation of the catch function and the
cost function it will be possible to turn to more practical problems.

To estimate a catch function it is necessary

to specify its form as well as the variables which will be
chosen to enter in the regressions.
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In the fishery economic
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literature, the usual form of the catch function is a CobbDo uglas type production function.

Dependent upon the fish-

eries , various independent variables have been selected to
explain the level of the catch.

Several surveys estimating

ca t c h functions will be examined.
When the model has been devised, and the form of
the c a t ch function as well as the variables have been chose n , a last problem remains.

Since 1940 an _abundant lite-

rature has been devoted to the statistical difficulties of
es t i ma ting production functions.
a co n se n s us in the mid-1960's.

It seems to have reached
Many of the articles written

on t h e s ubject will be reviewed and the present state of
the agreement will be exposed.

A theoretical model of the

fis h ing industry is presented in Section I.

Studies, which

have d ealt with the choice of a catch function and the selection o f the variables are reviewed in Section II.

Final-

l y, Sec t ion III is a discussion of the econometric questions
raised by the estimation of production functions.

I
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An Economic Model of the Fishing Industry
The first economic model of the fishing industry was

p ro posed by Gordon.

1

It presented the economics of the

f is hery in the context of a comparative static analysis.
Thi s model was subsequently developed by various authors
2
3
4
incl uding Scott
Turvey
and Smith.
The model used in this study includes the latest
de v e l o pments proposed by those economists.

It is composed

of t hree equations:
(1 )

a recruitment rate function
dX/dt

=

f (X, m, kx)

X biomass
m mesh size
k number of vessels in the fishery
x average vessel catch
In a simp l er model m, which introduces mesh externalities;
can be ignored .

1

H. Scott Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property
Resourc e : The Fishery", pp. 124-142 .
2

Anthony Scott, "The Fishery : The Objectives of Sole
Owners hip ", Journal of Political Economy, 63 (April, 1955)
pp. 11 6- 124 .
3

Ralph Turvey, "Optimization in Fishery Regulation",
(March, 1964), pp. 64-76.

~eric an Economic Review, 54
4

Vernon L . Smith, "On Models of Commercial Fishing'',
Journa l o f Political Economy, 77 (March/April, 1969),
pp. 1 81-198 .
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(2)

a catch function

x = g(z,X,k)
x average vessel catch
z input vector
X biomass
k number of vessels in the fishery
In this equation, k, which represents crowding externalities, can be ignored to simplify the model.
(3)

a cost function

c

=

w z

C total cost
w vector of input prices
z input vector
A question arises concerning the possibility of applying
a classical model such as this one to a traditional economic activity.

It was mentioned earlier that the artisan

fishermen in Puerto Rico belonged for the most part to a
traditional sector of the society, and, consequently, that
many of their decisions were influenced by customs and
common practice in the community.

As a result it would not

be appropriate to postulate that those fishermen are always
economically rational, or, for instance, to assume that
they are able to maximize their profits.

However, it will

be shown in the last section of this Chapter, that provisions can be made to have the classical model account for

51
the lack of knowledge or the distorted perception of the
economic environment (prices, technical coefficients)
resulting from the social constraints.
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II

Definition of a Catch Function and Selection of
the Variables
The definition of a catch function raises questions

which are often specific to the fishing industry investigated and to the species caught by that industry.

How-

ever, much can be learned in reviewing earlier studies in
which catch functions were estimated .

Two kinds of inf or-

mation can be derived from the literature.

One concerns

the type of catch function fitted to the data;

the other

regards the choice of the dependent and independent variables.
Most of the production studies assume that the external diseconomies (Resource stock, crowding, mesh externalities) are negligeable. 5

5F

In only one instance does Bell

. J W. Bell, "The Relation
·
•
re d eric<.
of the Production
Function to the Yield on Capital for the Fishing Industry,"
Recent Developments and Research in Fisheries Economics,
Ed. by F.W. Bell and J.E. Hazelton (Dobbs Ferry, New York:
Oceana Publications, Inc., 1967).
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, "Gross Section Production
Fu~ctions of North Atlantic Ground Fish and Tropical Tuna
Seine Fisheries". · Earnest w. Carlson in Ocean Fishery
Management: Discussions and Research, Ed . by A. A. Sokoloski,
~OAA Technical Report 371, November, 1970
(Seattle, Washington, April 1973), pp. 42-56.
.
Bruno G. Noetzel and Virgil J. Norton, Cost and Earn~g~ in the Boston Large-Trawler Fleet, Economics of
Marii:ie Resources, 8(University of Rhode Island Experiment
Station No. 1329, Kingston, Rl-iode Island, 1969).
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,_
.
a c count for resource stoch
externa 1.ities
.6

When exter-

nal diseconomies are ignored, the catch functions used
are of the Cobb- Douglas type .

6

Frederick hi . Bell, "Technological Externalities and Common
Property Resources : An Empirical Study of the U.S. North~rn Lob s ter Fishery" .
Journal of Political Economy, 80
January / February, 1972), pp. 148-158 .
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The Dependent Variable

r

The variables introduced in the catch function vary
according to the fishery investigated.

The dependent

variable is usually the value of the landings

7

sometimes the weight of the catch is preferred.

although
8

Carlson

9

shows that when the fishermen have the choice of catching
different species they "take into account expected prices,
expected catch rates, and steaming time to the grounds and
make decisions as to where to go and what to fish."lO

In

that case the value of the catch is a better measure of
output (an example of such a situation is the New England
trawler fleet).

On the other hand, for the tropical tuna

seine fisheries, the weight of the catch is a better measure of output because in the case of tropical tuna fisheries, "the species are ... joint products.

That is, the

fishermen take as much of both species (Yellow-fin and

7

Bell, "The Relation of the Production Function to the
Yield on Capital for the Fishing Industry."
Bell, "Technological Externalities and Common Property
Resources."
8

Noetzel and Norton, Cost and Earnings in the Boston
Trawler Fleet.
9

Carlson, "Cross-section Production Functions."

10

.

~., p.

47.
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skyjack ) a s they can in an effort to fill their holds as
quic k ly as possible."
II

11

Th e Independent Variables
The independent variables always include one or more

measures of capital.

Physical measures are chosen more

frequentl y than monetary ones .

Gross tonnage of the

vessel and horsepower of the main engine are the most
commonly chosen .
In many s tudies some monetary value of the fixed
asset is us ed as an independent variable .
advantage t ha t

This has the

i t allows for a more immediate estimate

of the retu rn on capital.

The problem then arises of

choosin g a mo ng various measures of the value of capital .
This difficulty is not specific to the fishing industry
and the lite rature dealing with that question is abundant.

Bell use s historical book value of assets but he

notes tha t t hi s method, "presents many difficulties.
First each b alance sheet reflects different

prices

pending on the date o f acquisition of the assets .

deMost

fishing v e ss els are sold often during their lifetimes
and (histor i c al book values)

actually reflect the last

purchase o r r es ale price . 1112

For those reasons he also

11

Carlson, "Cros s-section Production Function." p. 49.

12
y·Bell, "The Relation of the Production Function to its
ield on Capital for the Fishing Industry", p. 91.
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suggests a method of adjusting historical prices to constant
dollars.

This a p proach is questionable since it does not

take into account the life of the boat.

Usually, some

measure of depreciation is preferred to a mesure of total
assets.

In estimating agricultural production functions.

The historical tendency has been ... to measure
the input of durable assets by the actual maintenance and depreciation costs associated with
their ~se rather th~n ~~ their capital value
on an inventory basis.
If this measure of capital is selected some difficulties
remain, however, since there are various alternatives to
compute depreciation costs.

"A practicable measure of

the true cost of using a machine for a particular purpose
is the return from the next most profitable use of replacement-cost depreciation, whichever is highern.

14

Opting for replacement-cost hardly solves the problem, for "Reproduction cost is an imaginary cost 1115 and
one has to decide upon a definition of replacement cost.
For instance, should it be "the current cost of a new

13

Earl 0. Heady and John L. Dillon, Agricultural Production
Function (Ames, Iowa:
Iowa State University Press, 1961),
p. 221.

14
M H. Speight, Economics and Industrial Lfficiency
acMillan & Co. Ltd., 1962), p. 184.

15

(London:

Charles F . Phillips Jr., The Economics of Regulation
(Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 1969), p. 235.
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vessel to replace a similar vessel in the fleet

1116

or the

current cost of a similar used vessel?
Given the difficulties discussed above, present market value of the asset appears to be especially useful
given its practical advantage of being relatively easily
determined.

In Holmsen's study of the small trawler fleet.

The owner of the vessel was asked what he considered
the market value. This figure was checked with the
last appraisal of the vessel by an independent surveyor either for a bank or for an insurance firm.
The rate of depreciation was determined by asking
the owner how long the thought he would keep the
vessel and, asswning a constant price level, what
he thought the different components t~7n would be
worth (sales value or salvage value) .
This approach is particularly useful in the case of
an artisanal fishery where some of the boats are built
by the fishermen themselves.
Another problem arising when estimating catch functions
is the measurement of management.
attention in fisheries studies.

This has received little
Be11 18 and Noetzel and

16

Crutchfield and Zellner, Economic Aspects of the Pacific
Halibut Fishery, p. 78.
17

Andreas A. Holmsen, "The Economics of the Small Trawler
Fleet, "Recent Developments and Research in Fisheries
Economics, Ed. by F.W. Bell and J.E. Hazleton (Dobbs
Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1967) p. 126.
18
.Bell, "The Relation of the Production Function to the
Yield on Capital for the Fishing Industry."
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. t e b e t ween various
.
Norton 19 di. ff erencia
c 1 asses o f b oa t s
by introducing dummy variables for different sizes.

This

method is similar to the one used to test for differences
of technical efficiency among groups of producers.

Al -

though Bell finds a significant difference between the
economic performance of the small boats and of the big
boats 20 he believes that the data available are not sufficient to decide what causes this disparity.
More numerous examples of attempts at measuring
management can be found in farm management studies.

In

most of t his work the methodology used is directly linked
to the mean chosen to estimate the production functions.
For that reason it will be treated in the next section
which deals with estimation of the catch function.

19

Noetzel and Norton , Costs and Earnings in the Boston
!!_awler Fleet.
20

Bell, "The Relation of the Production to the Yield on
Capital for the Fishing Industry," p. 114.
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III

E s timating the Catch Function
Cobb-Douglas functions are those most frequently

used to describe catch functions.

This section will con-

sider t h e problems associated with estimating a function
o f that f o rm .

Then some remarks will follow dealing with

the a ctual measurement of diverse types of managerial
abilities.
I

Estimating a Cobb-Douglas Production Function.
Marsc h a k and Andrews are among the first economists

to have given much attention to the difficulties of prof unctions.
.
21
. ting
.
.
per 1 y estima
pro d uction

They show that

"the economist is confronted not only with a single equation, but ·with a system of

( . .. ) equations none of which

.
,, 22
h e can ign o re .

This system of equations contains a "production
equation ."

In a two-input case i t will have the form:

( 3-1)

where x
puts.

0

is the level of output and x

1

and x

2

are the in-

It also includes two "marginal-productivity equa-

tions":

21

. Jacob Mar s chak and William H. Andrews Jr., "Random
Simultaneous Equations and the Theory of Production",

pp. 14 3-20 5

221

~., p . 144.
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(3-2)
where p

0

,

p , and p are respectively the prices of x
2
0
1

,

x , and x .
Those equations are further specified by
2
1
introducing the concepts of "technical efficiency" and

"economic efficiency".
The production function will change, even within
the same industry, from firm to firm and from
year to year, depending on the technical knowledge, the will, the effort and luck of a given
entrepreneur;
these facto23 can be summarized
as "technical efficiency".
Assuming that the production function is the same for

all firms except for the "technical efficiency" represented
by Ef (3-1) will become:
(3-3)

XO=

¢(xl,x2,Ef)

Then "economic efficiency" is defined by Marschak and
Andrews as "The ability or willingness to choose, or luck
in choosing the most profitable combination of resources

11

24
•

However, in the more recent literature what was called
"economic efficiency" by Marschak and Andrews is now referred to as "Price efficiency".

"A firm is price effi-

cient if it maximizes profits i.e., it equates the value

23

.

~-, p. 145.

241

_bid., p. 145.
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of the marginal product of each variable input to its
. " . 25
price
on the other hand, in the latest literature, the concept of "economic efficiency'' is used to refer to the combination of technical and price efficiency.

This termino-

logy will be used throughout the remainder of this study.
Economic efficiency accounts "for firms that produce different quantities of output from a given set of measure inputs of production.

This is the component of differences

in technical efficiency ...

It also takes into account that

different firms succeed to varying degrees in maximizing
profits, i.e., in equating the value of the marginal product of each variable factor of production to its price.
This is the component of price efficiency 11

26
•

Introducing price efficiency µf and Bf into the "marginal-productivity equation, "equations (3-2) becomes:
(3-4)ox /ox
0

1

=A (µf' p 1 /p 0 ) , ox0 /ox 2 = K(8f,p 2 /p 0

)

The next step is to find a proper method to estimate
these equations and to express the model accordingly.

25

Lawrence J. Lau and Pan A. Yotopoulos, "A Test of Relative
Efficiency and Application to Indian Agriculture", American
~conomic Review, 61 (March, 1971), p. 95.
26

~., p.

95.
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If we desire to estimate the value of x if x
and x should be determined not by that 0 set of
random2 causes which existed in the past but by
deliberate action then we have to estimate the
coefficients in the equation (3-3) .27
In fact,

since "each of the three variables x
o' xl'

x2 changes as the result of variations in the random fea,,28
One has to estimate
tures £ ' µ ' e ' from firm to firm.
simultaneously the system of equations

(3-3)

(3-4) since

least squares estimates of equation (3-3) alone will be
biased and inconsistent.
In the case of a production function of the CobbDouglas type:

x0

(3-5)
u

0

=

u

0

random variable with mean unity.

Under perfect competition (this assumption will be
maintained throughout this chapter) the system of equations to be estimated can be written:
(3-6)

x

oi

-a

1 xli

-a2x2i = /.. 0 +v oi

(3-7)

x oi-xli

l3-8)

x .-x . = /..2+V2i
01
2 J_

27

/..l+Vli

Marschak and Andrews, "Random Simultaneous Equations
and the Theory of Production," p. 151.
28

.

~-, p.150.
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.. = log x ..
where x Jl
Jl
>.
= log A

J= 0,1,2

0

v oi' vli' v2i
E(Vki)

=

0

E(Voi' vli)
{ E (Vk. ) '} 2
'l

=

are random variables
k

=

0,1,2

is independent of i
for all firms

"1

=

log (pl/poa l)

"2

=

log (p2/p o a 2)

Po' P1' P2 are the respective prices of x , x2, x3
1
v i can be called "technical disturbance" and v 1 i
0
and v i "price disturbance".
2
Little was added to Marschak and Andrews' model until
Hoch,

29

concerned with the problems stemming from the es-

timation of the system of equations, added a new element
to the theoretical framework.

In the early model, E(Vli)

=

E(V 2 i) = 0, and v i and v i are measures of the price effi2
1
ciency
or inefficiency).
"In this approach, however, the
'average' firm is defined to be the optimal firm

29

30

11
•

Irving Hoch, "Simultaneous Equation Bias in the Contest
of the Cobb-Douglas Production", Econometrica, 26 (October,
19 58)' pp. 566-578.
301
~-, p. 567.
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Hoch proposes to keep the properties of

v 1 i and v 2 i un-

changed but to introduce a term Rj such that in equations
(3-7) and

A . becomes:
J
\ J.
log(p.R ./p a. )
J J
0 J

(3-8)

=

(3-9)
In equation

(3-9) R . represents the effects of disJ

turbances which affect all the firms and prevent them from
maximizi ng their profit.
"In this formulation, R . can of course vary among
J

firms:

but, for a sample of firms,

the investigator would

be interested in testing whether the average R. is equal
J

to one.

1131

This precision added to the accuracy of the traditional model.
ning of V . .
01-

Yet a problem remained concerning the meaWalters notes, that

Marschak and Andrews interpret the disturbance as
analogous to an experimental error.
But there is
more to it than that.
The variation in output of
a particular firm from year to year may be due to
exogenous random causes (such as the weather) but
the differences between one firm and another due
to the 'ability' of the entrepreneur w~~l be constant over time for a particular firm.

31Ib '

~·r

p. 568.

32

A.A. Walters, "Production and Cost Functions: An
Econometric Surve y ," Econometrica, 31 (January/April,
1963) ' p. 14.
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one may add that even for cross-section data the
variation in output between different firms may be partly due to "exogenous random causes" such as different
If this is so one can write

quality inputs.

= V01.. ++V 01.. *

V .

(3-10)

01.

Where V . measures the technical efficiency while V .*
01.

01.

is a stochastic disturbance representing the "exogenous
random causes".

33

But now output is a function of V

. *.

01.

Consequently,
... the production function and profit function for
the individual entrepreneur are stochastic ... Thus,
the rationale for assuming deterministic profit
maximixation, as is done in the traditional approach,
is at variance with the above interpretation of V . ;
01
an interpretation which appears to be consistent
with that in the literature.34
Recognizing this conflict, Zellner, Kmenta, and Dreze
propose a new model where the production function of each
firm is stochastic:
(3-11)

x

0

= AX

u .

a
1

l

e

01.

... Where u . is a random disturbance representing
factors su8fi as weather, unpredictable variations
in machine or labor performance and so on. Whenever the production process is not instantaneous,
the effect of the disturbance on output cannot be
known until after the preselected quantities of
inputs have been employed in production.35

33

A. Zellner, J. Kmenta, and J. Dreze, "Specification and
Estimation of Cobb-Douglas Production Function Models",
Econometrica, 34 (October, 1966), p. 786.
34
1
~.,
p. 786.
35

~-, p. 787.
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It is assumed that the entrepreneur attempts to maximize his expected profit and that the prices are known
with certainty.
Expected profit can be expressed as:
(3-12)
if u

0

is normally distributed, N

0

a

oo

)

=

E(X )

( 3-13)

(u ,

0

Even if the prices are perfectly known, the entrepreneur may not use the optimum combination of inputs.
production model becomes

= a 0 + u Ol.
(3-15)

x

(3-16)
with

.

Ol

=

k' + u

x .

=

k' 2+ u Ol. + U2i

Ol

=

k~

J

log(p.R./p a.)
J J

0

J

-~a

1

oi + u li

00

Putting the model in reduced form:

(l- a
(3-18) xli

1

-a )
2

=

{ao + (a2-l)

ki

-a2k2+ (a2-l)uoi -alu2i}/

The
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(3-19)

x21

= {a o+ (a l-1) k2 - a lkl + (a l-l)u2i- a lili }/
(1- a

1

-a )
2

It appears that x i and x i
1
2

are independent of u i.
0

This has important practical consequences,
Clearly in the new model with the assumptions that
E(u . , u .) = E(u . ,u . ) = 0, simple least squares
1i
oi
oi. 2 i
.
.
estimators are consistent; under normality, or with
the stronger assumption that u . and u . are statistically independent of u . , th~9 are afso unbiased.36
oi
This is useful result since i t is now possible to
obtain estimates of the production function using single
least squares estimators of the logarithm of the production function.
Marschak and Andrews' model was criticized, however,
because it did not allow for the possible existence of a
random element in the variable V
technical efficiency).

0

(V

0

was a measure of

The opposite criticism can be direc-

ted to the new model for not allowing the possibility of a
variable accounting for managerial ability in the term u ..
oi
In practice, however, many economists use single least
squares to estimate the logarithmic form of the production
function.

At the same time they interpret u . as measuring
oi
both exogenous random causes and the technical ability of
the entrepreneur.

36

!,Pid., p. 789.

In a study of Indian agriculture Lau and
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and Yotopoulos write
Here we assume that the error in the profits is
due to climatic variation, ... , imperfect knowledge
of the technical efficiency parameter of the farm
and differences in technical efficiency among farms
within the same size class.37
Yet they add
Hence one can estimate the natural logarithms of
the profit function alone with the least squares
estimator which in this case turns out to be minimum variance, linear and unbiased.38
Despite these difficulties in interpreting the disturbance term, in empirical studies, single equation least
squares is
... quite the most popular method of estimating the
parameters of the Cobb-Douglas function ... The
attractive properties of the least squares single
equation method are the simplicity of computations,
the small standard errors of the coefficients and
the high level efficiency in predecting output for
g~ven inputs.39
All the studies of catch function mentioned earlier
used that method of estimation.

Many instances of that

practice can also be found in agricultural economics. 40

36

Ib1'd., p.

789.

37

Lau and Yotopoulos,
p . 104.

"A Tests of Relative Efficiency;;"

38Ib'
~., pp. 104-105.

39
40

Walters,

"Production and Cost Function," pp. 18-19.

Heady and Dillon, Agricultural Production Functions.
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In most cases estimating the production function is
but one step of the analysis.

Being able to comment on

the economic efficiency of the firms or of several groups
of firms is just as important for the researcher.
II

Measuring Economic Efficiency.
Considering the system of equation ( 3- 6) ,

( 3- 7) ,

and (3-8) where, now
(3-20)>..

J

(3-2l)x

= log

p . + log R. -log Po -loga .
J
J
J

oi - a lxli - a 2x2i

= >. 0 + v oi

From equation (3-21) i t appears immediately that V .

Ol

cannot be estimated alone and that only the quantity V .+
Ol

>-

0

can be computed.

Consequently, it is impossible to de-

fine a perfectly technically efficient firm.

Nevertheless,

if one distinguishes two groups of firms with the same production function, i t is possible to compare the technical
efficiency of the two groups by introducing

a dummy variable

S taking the value 1 for one group, 0 for the other, such
that

and then test for

o=O.

If

o=O

no group of firms is

significantly more or less technically efficient than the
Other.
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To conduct tests on price efficiency note that equations

(3-20) and

(3-23) can be written:

(3-24) x . +log p . - x .. -log p. =log R.-loga.+V ..
Ol

Ol

posing: y 0 i

Jl

x . + log p
Ol

J

J

J

Jl

0

y . . = x . . + log p .
Jl

Jl

J

where y . is the logarithm of the total revenue while
Ol

y .. is the logarithm of the amount of money spent on input
Jl

j .

(3-25) y . - y .. =log R. -log a .+ v ..
Ol

Jl

J

J

Two kinds of tests are possible.

Jl

Taking the averages

Y . and y . . from all firms i = 1 ... , n. one can tests if
Ol

Jl

Y0 i - yji

is significantly different from -log a j, which

is equivalent to testing for log R. = 0 or R. = 1 since
J

J

E(V .. ) = 0 by definition.
Jl

An alternative method of computation yields the same
results.

Instead of using the logarithms of the total

revenue and of the various outlays, the same test can be
conducted taking the geometric means of the total revenue
and the various outlays.
Consider the anti-logarithm of equation (3-25)
(3-26)

y

.

Ol
y . .
Jl

=

R.
_l_

e

v ..

Ji

a .
J

where y 0 i = log Y0 i and yji

log

y ..
Jl
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v ..

For a sample of n firms E(e Jl) = 1 since E(V . . ) = O.
Jl
The maintained hypothesis is then:
n
l/n
(3-27) H: II
(Y
/Y .. )
= l/a.
0
i=l
0 1
Jl
J
which is the same as testing for
R.

( 3- 2 8)

If H

0

J

= 1

is rejected the conclusion

is that "firms in

the sample ( ... ) exhibit systematic errors, perhaps as a
result of institutional or other constraints, with respect
to satisfying the first order conditions

41

11
•

This kind of

test has often been performed on agricultural production
42
.
f unctions.

Using either equation (3-25) or equation(3-26) another
kind of test can also be conducted.
Since R. tends to be the same for all firms, instead
J
l/n
n
l/n
n
y . )
and( II
Y .. )
of taking the geometric means (II
Ol
i=l Jl
i=l
for the whole sample, one can divide the sample into classes
and compute the geometric means for the firms in each class.
If the sample is divided into two groups containing
respectively s and n-s firms the maintained hypothesis will
be:

41

Zellner, Kmenta, and Dreze, "Specification and Estimation
785.

Of the Cobb-Douglas Production Function Models", p.
42

Heady and Dillon, Agricultural Production Functions,
p. 570 and ff.
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s
( 3- 2 9)

H

0

:

IT

i=l

(Y

. /Y .. )
Ol

Jl

l/s

n
IT

i-s+l

which is equivalent to testing
v ..
s
h
Jl
Ee
1
1
Ee
( 3-30
i=l
s
i=S+l
n-s
If H

0

l/n-s
(Y

. /Y .. )
Ol

Jl

v ..

Jl

is not rejected the two groups of firms are as

price efficient (or as price-inefficient) .

If H is reo

jected one group is more price efficient than the other.
Finally, one remark concerning the hypothesis of
equation (3-26)

should be added.

If one assumes that R.

J

is always equal to unity then hypothesis H

0

is always true

and equat ion (3-26) provides another method to compute
the coefficients of the production function.
£erred to as the factor shares method.

This i s re-

Despite its ob-

vious simpli city it has not been used frequently.
The reason for this neglect was probably the desire
of early authors to test their estimates of the production function against the known facts about ~he
43
dist ribution of income among factors of production.
As mentioned earlier, the classical model, with its
assumption of maximized profit, was not adequate to represent the true economic behavior a traditional economic activity.

But the introduction of the concept of price effi-

ciency eliminates this objection and i t is now possible to
conceive a theoretical model, based on the classical approach
Which will apply to trap and hand line fishing in Puerto Rico.

43

Walters, "Production and Cost Function", p. 21

IV

DEFINITION OF THE CATCH FUNCTION
AND THE TESTS OF EFFICIENCY:
A THEORETICAL APPROACH

In this chapter a model is developed to represent the
fishing operations with traps and with lines as well as the
costs associated with these activities.

The prices of the

output and of the input will be assumed constant.

In the

case of the output the prices recorded by the Puerto Rican
Department of Agriculture show very little change over the
1

months and sometimes over the years.

As for the inputs such

as motors, winches, chicken wire, lines etc., they are sold
by the Department of Agriculture and their prices are also
quite stable.
Th~

catch functions are defined in Section I and many

of the characteristics of the classical models introduced.
Next the catch functions are expressed in an econometric
form and some simplifications introduced;

in Section III

the concepts of technical and price efficiencies are introduced in the model and the difficulties arising from the
designing of statistical tests for the various efficiencies

1

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Agriculture,
Status of Fisheries in Puerto Rico, 1972 by Jose A. Suarez
Caabro, Agricultural and Fisheries Contribution, Vol. V,
No. 3, Puerto Rico, p. 48.
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discussed.
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Finally, in Section IV a practical problem

dealing with the imputation of some fixed costs among
several activities will be examined.

r
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Definition of the Catch Functions.

Let X . be the annual catch of firm i from traps
Toi
i = l ... m
Let X . be the annual catch of firm i from hand
Loi
lines i

= m-s ... n

In this notation, m firms practice trap fishing,
n-m+s firms practice hand line fishing and s firms practice both.
The catch functions can be written:
aq
Q
( 4-1) x
.
= KTMT N II
XTqi
Toi
q=l
Q
( 4-2)

XLoi = KLML

N

II
q=l

Sq
XLqi

XToi = annual catch from traps

XLoi = annual catch from hand lines
KT and KL are constant terms
MT and ML represent crowding externalities
and mesh externalities
Q

II
q=l

xTqi.

Q

and II
XL . are input vectors representing
q=l
qi

capital, labor and management used by the firm when fishing,
respectively, with trap and hand lines.
N

is the fish population.
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s ince the model is developed in the framework of
comp a rative statics it is assumed that the fish populatio n s is in equilibrium at N.
MT and ML measure the effects of the crowding external i t ies and of the mesh externalities upon the catch
fro m traps and the catch from lines.

The crowding facto r

ma y b e due to the number of boats or to the number of
tra p s o n the same fishing grounds which force the fishermen to be more careful or to spend more gasoline to navigate i n tho s e areas.

The mesh size used to build the traps

affects the population of fish caught by lines.

It is pro-

bable tha t in reality this effect is different upon the two
populatio ns .

Yet in both cases the mechanism is the same

with t he bigger mesh size releasing the bigger fish which
ca.n k eep participating in the population reproduction process.
Th e difficulty of assessing the value of MT and ML is
obv i ous but in a study of the fishing industry at a given
point in time they are fixed. When estimating the catch
funct i ons their value will be embodied in a constant term
2
.
.
. f ront o f t h e equa t ion.
a.pp earing
in
Th e equilibrium population

N depends

upon some natu-

ral fac t o rs as well as on the fishing pressure.
I f no fishing takes place, the fish populations's

2

E.c. Pielou, An Introduction to Mathematical Ecology,
Wiley Interscience (New York, 1969).
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growth rate is given
(4-3) dN/dt

by the Verhulst-Pearl equation.

2

= N (a-bN)

where dN/dt is the growth rate of the fish population over
time
N is the size of the population at a moment in time
a is the rate of natural increase
a

a/b

=

¢ -

µ

¢

birth rate of each individual

µ

death rate of each individual

= N* is the maximum size that the population can reach.

Equation (4-3) can also be written
(4-4)

dN/dt

= bN (N*N)

If the fishery is exploited it becomes necessary to
account for man's effect on the resource.

The growth rate

of the fish population is then:
(4-5) dN/dt

= bN (N*-N) - FN

where FN is the catch rate and F is the fishing mortality
coefficient.
In a steady-state situation dN/dt = 0, which means
that there is no change in the level of the population
over time.
(4-6) bN(N*-N) - FN

= 0

If such an equilibrium is reached, equation (4-6) is
valid over any period of time provided that the rates bN
and FN correspond to that same period of time.
2

W~l· C. Pielou, An Introduction to Mathematical Ecology ,
1

ey Interscience (New York, 1969).
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If a period of one year is chosen, FN is the annual

catch.
In the present study, if i t is assumed:
1)

that the population is homogeneous and therefore

that interspecies relationships can be ignored ,
2)

that the catch affects the population in the same

fashion, whatever the fishing method used, then FN can
be divided in three elements
= total annual catch from traps

EXT
.
.
Ol

l

IXL
.
.
01

total annual catch from hand lines

l

= total annual catch from all other methods.

EZ.
l

.

l

Combining equations

(4-1) ,

(4-2) and (4-6)

the growth rate

of the fish population is now
Q
(4-7) bN (N*-N) - ~(KTMTN) IT
l
q=l

- E Z. = 0
i

Dividing by

N,

-

where F

A

N~

0
Q
ai
Q
Bq
~ (KT~ IT , XT .) - E ( KLMLN TI
XLqi)
l
q=l qi
i
q=l

with

(4-8) b(N*-N) -

l

F

A

= 0

is the fishing mortality coefficient from other

fishing methods.
Equation (4-8) expresses the biological constraint
to which the industry is s ubj ect when maximizing p r ofit.
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From equation ( 4-8) i t is p ossibl e to deduce:
a
Q
Q
q
L
(K
M
IT
X q.)
IT
( 4-9) N
XTqi)
i
L Lq=l Lqi
q=l

s

-

Replacing N in equations
from equation (4-9)
(4-10) XToi =

{N *

(4-1)

and (4-2) by its value

the catch functions can be written:
Q
a
Q
S
1 {"~ ( KTMT IT
XTq.)- L (KLML IT
XLq.)
q=l
qi
i
q=l
qi
b
i
Q

- FA }} KTMT
(4-11) XL oi.

1

= {N* - -

b

IT

q=l

a
Q'
S
XTqi.)- L (KLML IT X q.
q=l q
q=l Lqi

Q
{L. (KTMT IT

i

Q

rr

q=l

Equations

(4-10)

a
q
XT qi.

sq

xLqi.

and (4-11) reveal the presence of

externalities in the fisheries since the catch of firm i
is a functio n not only of its fishing effort but also of the
total fishing effort in the fisheries.
Yet, at a given point in time, N is fixed and for a
cost-production analysis of a fishing industry in a given
year, the catch functions can be estimated in the form given
in equations

(4-1) and (4-2).
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Q

XToi

= (KTMTN)

TI

q=l

Cl

q
XTqi

or
(4-12)

Q
A IT

XToi

q=l

Cl

q
XTqi

and
Q'

XLoi

= (KL ML N)

IT

q=l

sq
XLqi

or

(4-13)

XLoi

Q
sq
= B IT
XLqi
q=l
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II

Econometric Formulation of the Catch Functions
c onsider the general catch function:
(4 - 14)

0

a

Q
TI

= A

X

x

q

q

q=l

Fo llowing Zellner, Kmenta and Dreze
med t hat the catch function of firm i
the form
Q
( 4 - 15)

x oi =

A TI

q=l

a

u

x q e
qi

OJ.

3

i t will be assu-

is stochastic and of

with u OJ..-N(O, a·00 )

I n a ddition, i t is assumed that the prices of the inputs a re known with certainty and that the fishermen maximize t h e expected profit.
(4- 16)

where p

0

E( TI .)
l.

=

p E(X .)
0

OJ.

-

tp X

.

q qi

i s the price of the output and pq is the price of

input q
From equation (4-15)
(4-1 7)

E(X

.)

OJ.

=

Q
A TI

~a

e

00

q=l

a 00 is t he variance of the catch function disturbance.

3

This e xpose follows the developments in Zellner, Kmenta
& Dreze " Specification and Estimation of Cobb-Douglas Productio n Function Models".
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The first order conditionsto maximize the expected
profit are represented by q equations:
(4-18)

aE (Xoi)

axqi.
~a

a x
(4-19)

00

.e

q oi

axqi.

Equation (4-19) can be assimilated to an ex-ante expression.
That is, it represents the conditions which should be met
if expected profit is to be maximized.

It applies to the

situation before any fishing takes place.

However, after

the fishing, ex-post, the catch and the profit become
actual values which now differ from the expected ones by
u

.

the stochastic term e oi

Ex-post the situation can be

written.
~a

(4-20)

a.

X

.e

00

q oi

u

.

X . e oi

qi

or, taking the natural logarithm of equation (4-20)
(4-21)

lnX . - lnX . = lnp - lnp -lna. oi
qi
q
0
q

~a

00

+u .
oi

In reality, it is likely that the first order conditions for maximizing profit will not be exactly satisfied.
Two sets of reasons may concur to lead to a less than optimum combination of inputs:
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The firms may be subject to a common set of

a)

co nditions which influence the ir choice of the q uantity
o f inputs .

Those conditions may b e d ue to tradition or

to the institutions.
to al l

In that case, a term Rq, common

firms, may be introduced in the first orde r con-

ditio n equations to account for that <listurbance.
(4 - 22)

lnX .
oi

lnX .
qi

=

lnp

q

- lnp

0

- lna q

- .la
2

00

+ u oi.
writing
(4 - 23)

Equation

k

q

(4-22)

(4 - 24)

=

lnp

q

- lnp

0

- .!a
2

00

-

lna

q

becomes

ln X . - ln X .
oi
qi

=

u

.

oi

b } Besides the traditional and institutional disturbance s common to all firms, each fisherman will p erceive di fferently his own operation as well as the common
set o f o utput and input prices.

This different percep-

tion will make each entrepeneur choose quantities of inputs whi c h, probably, will be at variance from the amounts
he ought to use to maximize profit.
for b y introducing a term u qi.
condi t io ns .

This can be accounted

-N(O,a qq ) in the first order
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(4-25) ln X . - lnX . = k + R + u . + u .
oi
qi
q
q
oi
qi
The logarithm of the catch function in (4-15) and
the q first order conditions (4-25) represent a system of
q + 1 equations.
Without loss of generality the problem can be reduced
to a situation with two inputs and the system of 3 equations can be written:
(4-26)

lnX oi - a ln xli - a lnx i = a 0 + u oi
2
1
2

(4-27)

lnX

oi

lnXli = kl + Rl + uli + u oi

(4-28)

lnX
oi

lnX 2 i = k2 + R2 + u2i + u oi

where a

0

= lnA

From this set of equations it follows that:
(4-29)

lnX

oi

{a

=

-

0

al (kl + Rl + uli) - a 2(k

+ u2i)+ u.
(1 - a - a ) } I
io
1
2
(4-30)

lnXli
-a

(4-31)

+ (a 2 - 1)

0

+ R2 + u2i) }/
2 (k2

lnX 2 i
-a

{a

=

=

{a

0

+ (a l - 1)

+ Rl + uli) } I
1 (kl

q

+ R2

(1- a l - a )
2

(kl + Rl + uli)
(1 - a l

-

a 2)

(k2 + R2 + u2i)
(1

-

a l - a 2)

This shows that, assuming that the u i and u i are statis2
1
tically independent of u . , lnx . and lnx . are also staoi
1i
2i
tistically independent of u . , and consequently, the least
oi
square estimate

of (4-26) is consistent and unbiased.

85
A special case arises in the fishery when any kind of
lay system is used to pay the crew members.

In what situa-

tion the total wage actually paid is a function of the
actual output.

Yet it can be assumed that the amount of

labor hired is a function of the expected output, since
the decision of hiring is taken before the fishing trips.
In the simplest lay s y stem:

= y {p 0 E(X Ol.)

(4-32)

assuming, in this case, that E(X .) is a function of 3 in01

puts xl' x2' x3, expected profit becomes:
( 4 - 33 ) E( IT i) = poE(Xoi) - plXli - p3X3i
- y{ poE(Xoi) - P3X3i }
The system of equations (4-26),

(4-27), and(4-28) must now

be written:
(4-34)

a

0

+ u .

Ol

(4-35)
(4-36)
It is immediately apparent that the system of equations
(4-34),

(4-35), and (4-36) can be solved to show that even

When there is a lay system the levelsof the inputs are independent of u . .
Ol

In addition, it appears that another

86

equation is necessary to determine the amount of labor
In the present study X
will be considered given,
2i
or, which is the same, determined by factors outside the
model.
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The Measures of Efficiency

III
I

Technical Efficiency
Considering two groups of firms A and B, for each

there exists:
a

(4-37)

o

+ u

oi

in group Ai= 1 ...... s-1
in group Bi - s ...... n
If it is assumed that the two groups of firms have the
same production function except for a parameter representing technical efficiency, it is possible to test if this
parameter takes significantly different values in each
group.

This can be done by estimating equation (4-37)

separately for group A and group B.

This will provide

6 0 A for group A and 6 0 B for group B.

two estimates,

Assu-

ming that E(u . ) = 0 for any group of firms, it is possioi
ble to test for Ho:

a0 A

= 6 B.
0

Another and simpler method consists in estimating:
(4-38) lnX . = a
Ol

0

+ u . + o .S. + a lnX . + a lnx .
1
2
Ol
l l
2l
1l

where
S.

= 1 for

i = 1

s-1

S.

= O for

i = s

n

If

o

l
l

is not significantly different from zero the two

groups of firms do not have significantly different technical efficiencies.
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Dummy variables can be used to test relative efficiency among more than two groups of firms.

For instance,

the firms may be divided in group A (fishermen not using
that technique).

Another classification can be added to

those two groups, for instance, firms from region I,
region 2, and region 3.
In this case, equation (4-37) becomes:
(4-39)

a.

where the values of

s1 , s 2 ,

and

s3

0

+

u

.

01.

+

o1 s 1

are 0 or 1 according

to the subset to which firm i belongs.

s1 , s2 , s3

Table IV-I gives the values of
.

various cases.

for the

4

Each subgroup but one will be characterized by the
presence of one or more of the

o1

in its production func-

tion as shown by Table IV-2.
For firms of the same region
relative efficiency of

technique

firms using the same technique,

o1

o3

is a measure of the

B over technique A. For
and

o2

respectively mea-

sure the relative technical efficiency of region 2 and region 3 over region 1.
Tests can be conducted to check if one coefficient
or one group of coefficients is significantly different
4

Arthur S. Golberger, Econometric Theory,
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964) pp. 222-223.

(New York: John
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TABLE IV-1
THE USE OF DUMMY VARIABLES WHEN TWO
INDEPENDENT CRITERIA DIVIDE THE
SAMPLE IN SEVERAL SUBSETS

Regions

Techniques Used

I

sl

s2

s3

A

0

0

0

I

B

0

0

1

II

A

1

0

0

II

B

1

0

1

III

A

0

1

0

III

B

0

1

1
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TABLE IV-2
COEFFICIENT OF THE DUMMY
VARIABLES IN EACH SUBSET

Regions

Techniques
A

I
II
III

a

B
a

0

a + 01
0

a

a0 + 02

a

0

+ 03

0

+ 01 + 0 3

0

+ 02 + 03
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from zero.

This would reveal if there is a significant

difference in the various levels of technical efficiency.
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II

Price Efficiency
Two tests can be conducted concerning price efficien-

cy.

One relates to the eventual existence of constraints

common to all firms and expressed in the term R

q

tion (4-22).

of equa-

The second test concerns the term u . in
qi

the same equations, it is a measure of eventual price inefficiency in a given firm or group of firms.
1.

Testing for constraints common to all firms.
Equation (4-36) can be written, taking the averages

over all firms:
(4-40)

lnX .
oi

- lnX . + lnp + ~a
qi
0
00

ln(y - 1) = R

q

- lna

-

lnp

5

q

q

- lna

q

-

q

It is not possible to test directly for R
possible to test if R

q

= 0 but it is

in equation (4-40) it signi-

A

ficantly different from -lna

q

as obtained by the ordinary

least squares estimator of the logarithm of the production
function (equation (4-26)).
ly different from R

q

If -lna

q

is not significant-

- lna , the effect of the institutionq

al or traditional constraints, if they exist, does not
significantly prevent the fishermen from using the optimum
Combination of inputs.

5

~he following demonstration can be conducted with equation (4-27) or (4-28) the presence of ln(l -y) does not
affect the reasoning.
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2.

Test of u qi. .
Consider the two group s of f irms A and B as defined

in Section III-I
Group A

i

=

l

Group B

i

=

s

s-1
..... n

The first order condition for a firm in group A
lnX . - lnX . + lnp - lnp +
oi
qi
0
q

(4-41)

R + u . + u . qi
oi
q

=

i

=

l

lna

~

a

~

a

00

- ln( y -1)

q

s - l

.

for a firm in group B:
(4-42) lnX . - lnX . + lnp - lnp +
oi
qi
0
q

=
i

R q

lna

q

= s .

00

- ln( y - 1)

+ u qi. + u oi.
n

Where in group A (equation 4-41) or in group B (equation
4-42 ), the nature of the terms u . is the same and E (u .)=O.
oi
Ol

Consequent ly taking the averages over each group of firms
leads to:
lnX . - lnX . + lnp - lnp +
oi
qi
0
q

(4-4 3)

=
i

=

=

s

~

a

00

- ln( y - 1)

s-1

(4-44 ) lnX . - lnX . + lnp - lnp +
oi
qi
0
q

i

a

R - lna + u .
q
q
qi

1 .

=

~

R q
•

ln a

q
n

+ u .
qi

00

- ln( y -1)

94

I n both cases the left hand side of the equations can
b e computed since a

00

is obtained through the estimation

o f t he production function.

Then it is possible to test if

the r i ght hand sides of the equations are the same.

If H :
0

- lna + u .)
= (Rq - lna q + u qi.)Bis not rejected,
q
q
qi A
the two groups of firms do not have significantly different
(R

p r ice efficiency.
3.

De v is ing statistical tests for price efficiency.
When testing for the constraints common to all firms

it is nec essary to compare the right hand side of equation

- lnX
lnp + ~ 0 oo - lnp
qi +
oi
q
0
a s obtained from equation (4-26).

(4-40), l nX
A

to lna

-

ln(y

-

1)

q
A prob l e m arises because neither of the terms to be

compared h a s a normal distribution.

In equation (4-26),

A

a q, i.e., (a
not.

a ) has a normal distribution but lnaq does

11 2

In addition, because of the presence of the term

the right hand side of equation

distributed .

~a

00

(4-40) is also not normally

Consequently, it is not possible to devise an

exact s t a tistical test to compare the two estimates.

The

compari so n must then rely on the judgment of the researcher.
On t h e o ther hand, when comparing the price efficiency
of two g r o ups it is possible to compare .

6

Heady and Dillon, Agricultural Production Functions, p.562

6
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lnX . - lnX . + lnp - lnp Ol
qi
0
q
for each group and to treat a

00

~a

00

-

ln( y - 1)

as a constant.

Applying

the central-limit theorem to these expressions, it appears
that they tend toward a normal distribution.

The usual

test of hypotheses to compare means will then be devised
and conducted for these estimates.
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IV

The Cost Equation
Although the difficulties arising when defining the

cost equation are mainly of a practical nature,one theoretical problem deserves attention.

It concerns the im-

putation of some costs between various productive activities.

In the present study only trap and hand line fish-

ing are examined.

The fishermen however, are sometimes

involved in other activities requiring the use of some
of the inputs appearing in the catch function for traps
and hand lines (as in the case of the boat) .

When test-

ing for price efficiency it is essential to find an appropriate way to allocate those inputs and their costs between
the various activities.
The following example shows how this problem can be
treated.

Consider two production functions:
al a2
(4-45)
xoi = AXll x21

and
(4-46)

using one common input x , the prices are p
0
1
and p respectively.
4
The profit function
al a2
(4-47) n = poAX11x21 +

,

p , p ,
3
1
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The first order condition to maximize profit will be, for
Xl:

.oTI =
(4-48)--axl

a .

P x 01.

. 0

-

1

p

0

1

or
1

(4-49) x

Assume that
tion.

=

1

x1

is a fixed input and that p

1

is the deprecia-

If the equation (4-36) is unknown, one may still want

to test for price efficiency knowing equation (4-45) and p

x 42 .

4

If all the terms of equation (4-49) were known, the

depreciation could be inputed in the following fashion to
each of the activities:
Activity 1

zl

=

Activity 2

z2

=

alpoXol
plXl

8 1P4X42
plXl

However, since S is unknown another solution has to be
proposed.

If one assumed that a and S are not very diffe-

rent, that is, that the input elasticity of factor
the same

z1 =
and

x1

is

or nearly the same for Activity 1 and Activity 2.
poXol
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zl =

and

z2 =

It appears, in this Chapter, that if it is assumed
that crowding externalities and mesh externalities are
negligible, it is possible to use a catch function of
the Cobb-Douglas type which can be estimated at one point
in time.

However, in order to use ordinary least squares

for this estimation i t is necessary to assume that the
fishermen maximize the expected profit rather than the
actual profit.

Given this assumption, tests of technical

efficiency and of price efficiency can be conducted which
will provide further information concerning the behavior
of the fishermen.

V

ESTIMATION OF THE
CATCH FUNCTION

A Cobb-Douglas type function was chosen as the theoretical form of the catch function.

The production func-

tion of equation (4-14) suggested that such a form should
be used.

x .

01

=A

Q
TI

q=l

The advantages of using a function of this form for tests
of efficiency was discussed in Chapter IV.

In addition,

it appeared, a posteriori, that the choice of Cobb-Douglas
functions was appropriate given the high level of significance of the statistical estimators which were obtained with
such a function.
The main problem concerning the estimation of the catch
function is the choice of the variables.

This was done on

the basis of knowledge of the fishing operation and the statistical significance of the variables.
The discussion of the choice of variables is presented
jointly for hand line and trap fishing.
Two options existed in the choice of the dependent variable.

It could have been measured in dollars or in pounds.

In the following developments the annual catch will be measured in pounds.

The justification for doing so will be
99
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given in Section II.

The reasons leading to the choice

of the independent variables are presented in the preceding section.

I
I
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Choice of the Independent Variables
Bo at and Motor
It is to be expected that the catch or output of

either trap or line fishermen will be dependent in some
way on t he size of the boat and motor used by fishermen.
The d if f i c ulty is in specifying a variable or set of variables in u nit s which capture the effects of boat and motor.
One p o ssibility is to measure the boat and its motor
in p hys i c al terms.

The advantage of this is that the fish-

ermen ge nerally gave some accurate measures of the length
of the b o at and power of the engines.

However, to capture

the speci ficity of a boat and its motor many more variables
need to be known some of which (like the degree of maintenance) are difficult to evaluate.
An o ther problem arises if one chooses physical units.
A whole s et of variables are available:
capacity , power of the engine, etc.
outset t hat

length of the boat,

One suspects at the

they must be highly correlated and consequently

it is n e cessary to choose one which is representative of the
boat or t o devise a composite variable which would embody
most o f t h e characteristics.
This problem is avoided if the boat and motor are measured i n monetary terms.

This provides a single measurement

Which captures all the aspects of the input, provided one
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makes the assumption that the input is homogeneous.
choice however also has its drawbacks.

This

Quite often during

the interviews it appeared that the fishermen had difficulty evaluating the value of their boats. They were asked for
what price they would sell their boats today without the
motors. This figure was used as an estimate of the present
value of the boat.

The fishermen also estimated the num-

ber of years remaining in the life of their boats and the
average life of their motors. This last figure was checked
with an engine dealer and it appeared that 4 years was the
average.

The prices of the new engines were provided by

the Administracion de Servicios Agricolas (Puerto Rican
Department of Agriculture) which has been selling equipment
to the fishermen for the past ten years.
For those reasons, a priori, none of the options
available can be rejected.

All are tried in the regressions

and the results are compared.
Two monetary measures of capital are introduced:

the

present value of the boat and the motor and also the depreciation measured as:
(5-1)

TD = TB+TE+M
TD:

Total depreciation plus maintenance

TB:

Depreciation on the boat, that is the
present value of the boat divided by
the estimate of the remaining years
of boat's life.

TE:
M:
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Price of the new engine divided by
4 (estimated average life) .
Annual maintenance on the boat and
the engine.

Depreciation on the boat (TB) , depreciation on the
engine (TE), and maintenance

(M)

were also used as inde-

pendent variables.
The length of the boat and the power of the motor are
also used separetely and concurrently as a measure of this
input.

The various results are presented in Table V-1.

The regressions in Table V-1 should be read vertically.
For instance, the first regression in Table V-1-a is:
( 5-2)

LXl

=

-2.106 + 1.646
(1.113)
(0.408)
(-1.892)
(4.030)

LB +

0.729 LH + 0.070 LV
(0.171)
(0.058)
(1.206)
(4.268)

+ 0.538 LTT
(0.147)
(3.659)
(The first number in parentheses is the standard error of
the coefficient;
LXl:

the second number is the t-statistic).
natural logarithm of the catch from
traps

C is the constant term,

the other terms are natural logarithms of:
LB:
LH:
LV:
LTT:

length of the boat
number of man days at sea during
the year
number of gallons of gasoline used
during the year
number of traps owned.
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TABLE V-1
COMPARISON OF REGRESSION USING VARIOUS MEASURES
OF THE BOATS AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS
(The dependent variable is the annual catch measured in pounds)
a. Traps.
Independent
variab l es
constan t

Boat
length

Length
& power

-2.106
(1.113)
(-1.892)

-1.153
(1.326)
(-0.869)

1.646
(0.408)
(4.030)

1.187
(0.538)
(2.206)

Power of
engine

1.650
(0.400)
(4.117)

Natural
l ogarithm of
Length
o f boa t
power of
motor

0.195
(0.151)
(1.293)

0.415
(0.120)
(3.464)

man days
at sea

0.729
(0.171)
(4.268)

0.668
(0.176)
(3.796)

0.635
(0.185)
(3.432)

gasoline
used in a
year

0.070
(0.058)
(1.206)

0.091
(0.059)
(1.522)

0.106
(0.062)
(1.704)

traps
owned

0.538
(0.147)
(3.659)

0.523
(0.146)
(3.585)

0.533
(0.154)
(3.459)

R2

F( 4,34)
F( S,23)

0.921
100.093

0.925

0.914
90.930

81.995

The f i r s t number in each group is the coefficient of
the variab le . The first number in parenthesis is the
standard error and the second number is the t-statistic.
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TABLE V-1

(continued)

COMPARISON OF REGRESSION USING VARIOUS MEASURES
OF THE BOATS AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS
(The dependent variable is the annual catch measured in pounds.)
a.
Independent
variables

Capital
stock

Constant

-1.132
(1. 065
(-1.062)

Traps.

Depreciation

0.131
(0.896)
(0.146)

Boat Depreciation
engine depreciation
maintenance

3.137
(1.118)
(2.803)

Natural
logarithm of

0.462
(0.186)
(2.506)

total depreciation
depreciation
on motor

-0.340
(0.215)
(-1.578)

depreciation
on boat

0.157
(0.078)
(2.005)

maintenance

0.115
(0.122)
(0.948)

present
value

0.599
(0.182)
(3.289)

man days
at sea

0.729
(0.181)
(4.016)

0.786
(0.189)
(4.143)

0.716
(0.203)
(3.528)

gasoline
used in a
Year

0.081
(0.062
(1.314)

0.053
(0.064)
(0.822)

0.059
(0.067)
(0.870)

traps
owned

0.411
(0.165)
(2.489)
0.912
88.371

0.433
(0.176)
(2.458)
0.902
78.568

0.506
(0.184)
(3.034)
0.912

R2

F(4,34)
F(6,32)

55.247
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TABLE V-1 (continued)
COMPARISON OF REGRESSION USING VARIOUS MEASURES
OF THE BOATS AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS
(The dependent variable is the annual catch measured in pounds.)
b.

lines.

Independent
variables

Boat
length

Length
& power

Constant

-1. 536
(1.658)
(-0.926)

-2.758
(1.959)
(-1.408)

1. 976
(0.546)
(3.619)

2.923
(0.993)
(2.943)

Power of
ensrine
2.667
(1. 001)
(2.665)

Natural
logarithm of
length
of boat
power of
motor

-0.413
(0.351)
(-1.175)

0.438
(0.240)
(1.825)

man days
at sea

0.716
(0.085)
(8.419)

0.675
(0.111)
(6.068)

0.728
(0.108)
(6.744)

gasoline
used in
a year

-0.016
(0.048)
(-0.336)

-0.026
(0.107)
(-0.251)

0.008
(0.060)
(0.147)

R2
F(3-16)
F(4-15)

0.860
32.779

0.871

0.789
19.988

25.378

The first number in each group is the coefficient of
the variable. The first number in parenthesis is the
standard error and the second number is the t-statistic.

.
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(continued
COMPARISON OF REGRESSION USING VARIOUS MEASURES
OF THE BOATS AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS
(The d e pendent variable is the annual catch measured in pounds.)
b.
Independent
variables
Constan t

Capital
stock

-0.720
(1.646)
(-0.437)

lines.
Depreciation

0.751
(2.154)
(0.348)

Boat depreciation
engine depreciation
maintenance
9.947
(3.174)
(3.133)

Natural
logarithm of

0.555
(0.326)
(1.703)

total
deprecia tio n
depreciat i o n
of motor

-1.140
(0.464)
(-2.457)

depreci atio n
of boat

0.098
(0.195)
(0.501)

maintenanc e

0.032
(0.192)
(0.171)

present
value

0.688
(0.218)
(3.149)

man day s
at sea

0.763
(0.093)
(8 . 130)

0.776
(0.121)
(6.386)

0.778
(0.144)
(5.377)

gasolin e
used i n
a year

-0.002
(0.051)
(-0.052)

-0.016
(0.060)
(-0.269)

-0.069
(0.122)
(-0.570)

0.842
28.613

0.784
19.420

R2

F(3-16)
F(S-14)

0.844
15.200

The first number in each group is the coefficient of
the var i able . The first number in parenthesis is the
standard error and the second number is the t-statistic.
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F tests confirm that all the regressionsin Table V-1
are significant at the 1 percent level
F(4,34) = 3.93

F(5.33) = 3.64

F(6,32) = 3.42

F(3,16) = 5.29

F(4,15) = 4.89

F(5,14)

=

4.69

When the natural logarithm of the length of the boat,
the power of the motor, the total depreciation or the present value are used singly in the regressions their coeff icient is significant at the .05 level with the exception of
depreciation for hand line operations where the coefficient
is significant at the .10 level.
When the natural logarithm of the length of boat and
of the power of the motor are used concurrently, the coefficient of the latter is only significant at the .15 level.
This is due to the high correlation between the two variables (. 692).
When using concurrently the two measures of depreciation (boat and motor) and maintenance, the coefficient of
the maintenance is always insignificant.

This may be due

to the fact that this variable is correlated with many of
the others such as the natural logarithm of the depreciation
on the engine (.465) the natural logarithm of the number of
man days at sea in a year (.490) and the natural logarithm
of the number of traps

(.632).

A more disturbing characteristic of the latter regress ion is the negative coefficient of the natural logarithm of
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the depreciation of the boat.

This coefficient is signifi-

cant only at the .15 level for the traps but it is significant at the .05 level for the lines.

It seems to indicate

that the more one pays for an engine the less fish one
catches.

In the sample

This is only an apparent paradox.

of fishermen interviewed in Puerto Rico, some had second
hand Chevrolet engines which cost an average of $340 but
which are more powerful than the usual outboard motor
which cost an average of $525.

At the same time the fish-

ermen with the powerful engines catch more fish annually
(an average of 39.822 lbs. versus 7,296 lbs.
ermen with less powerful engines).

for the fish-

This explanation is

confirmed when comparing the following regressions:
a)
( 5-3)

catch from traps for all boats:
LXl

=
+

R

2

3.137 - 0.340 LDE
(1.118) (0.215)
(2.803) (-1.578)
0.716
(0.203)
(3.528)

= 0.912

+ 0.157

LDB

+ 0.115 LM
(0.122)
(0.948)

(0.078)
(2.005)

LH + 0.059 LV + 0.506 LTT
(0.067)
(0.185)
(3.034)
(0.870)
F

statistic (6,32)

=

55.247

The symbols in equation (5-3) represent the natural
logarithms respectively:
LXl:
LDE:
LDB:
LM:
LH:
LV:
LTT:

annual catch from traps in pounds
depreciation of the motor
depreciati o n of the boat
maintenance
number of man days at sea in a year
number of gallons of gasoline used in a year
number of traps owned
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b) Catch from traps for the boats with an engine
less or equal to 40 HP.
LXl = -0.783 + 0.714
(1.746) (0.418)
(-0.448) (1.707)

( 5-4)

LDE + 0.089 LDB - 0.040 LM
(0.084)
(0.137)
(1.061)
(-0.292)

+ 0.586 LH + 0.114
(0.202)
(0.067)
(1.689)
(2.900)
0.912

LV + 0.566 LTT
(0.184)
(3.080)

F statistic (6.26)

= 45.070

All the symbols are the same as in equation (5-3)
Equation (5-4) shows that when the influence of the
boats with powerful motors is removed, the coefficient of
LDE is positive for the catch from traps.

In the case of

the catch from lines the comparison between

equations (5-5)

and (5-6) shows that when the regression is limited to
boats which are equipped with an engine of 40 HP. or less
the coefficient of LDE is not significant.
c)
( 5-5)

Catch from lines for all boats:
LX6

= 9.947
(3.174)
(3.133)

+ 0. 778

-1.140 LDE + 0. 098
(0.464)
(0.195)
(-2.457)
(0.501)
LH

(0.144)
(5. 377)
0.844
d)
(5-6)

F

LDB+

0. 032
LM
(0.192)
(0.171)

- 0.069 LV
(0.122)
(-0.570)
statistic (5.14)

=

15.200

Catch from lines for less powerful boats (40 HP.
or less).
LX6 = 10.590 - 0.964 LDE + 0.007 LDB -0.368 LM
(8.149) (1.838)
(0.207)
(0.412)
(-0.892)
(1.299) (-0.524)
(0.036)
-0.060 LV + 0.690 LH
(0.079)
(0.140)
(-0.757)
(4.924)
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R2
LX6

=

= natural

pounds.

F statistic (5.10)

0.893

= 16.685

logarithm of the catch from lines measured in

All the other symbols are the same as in equation

(5-3).
Aside from the special case just presented, Table V-1
shows that the coefficient measuring the influence of the
length of the boat is significantly positive.
surprising.

This is not

Bigger and more powerful boats allow the fish-

ermen to go on more distant grounds and, for instance, to
fish at the edge of the continental shelf which is more
productive.

The larger boats can also fish under rougher

weather conditions.

They can go at sea more often (and this

will be accounted for in another variable) and they can also
stay at sea longer.

On a given day when the weather becomes

menacing, the smaller boats have to return sooner.

This

means that they cannot fish a long time with their lines.
Given the high significance of the regressions, a case
can be made to use any of them as representative of the fishing operation.

Later in this chapter when additional inde-

pendent variables are introduced, the comparison of the results is made using the regression with the length of the
boat since it has the highest R

2

and F statistics.

On the

other hand, in subsequent chapters, it will be more convenient to use others, particularly when testing for price
efficiency.

However it should be noted that because of the
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high significance of all the regressions and of their similarity, comparable results could be obtained no matter
which regression is used.
II

Traps
The natural logarithm of the number of traps owned

appears to be an important variable in the explanation of
the size of the catch.

In all the regressions of Table

V-1-a the coefficient of that variable is highly significant, except in the case where it is used in combination
with the present value of the boat.
The number of traps in the water would be more appropriate.

However, the interviews revealed that it was im-

possible to obtain a good estimate of that value from the
fishermen.

The reason is that the number of traps in the

water varies all the time.
immediately;

Some are lost and not replaced

others are pulled out to be repaired.

Con-

sequently the fishermen are unable to give an estimate of
the average number of traps in the water during the year.
On the other hand, they try to keep constant the number
of traps they have available.

It was thought that probably

there was a constant relationship between the number of
traps owned and the number of traps in the water.

This

assumption seems to be confirmed by the significance of the
coefficient of the

logarithm of the ..number of traps owned.
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Another approach to deal with the effect of the number of traps on the catch is proposed below although in
t h is c ase it does not give satisfying results.

It attempts

to take into account the average number of soak days for
each t rap.

Munro found

1

that for a given trap

=

r

Cs

=

catch on day s

r

= probability of retention in a trap
= daily availability or true rate of

( 5 - 7)

A

Cs- 1

r

A

ingress into a trap
or
( 5 - 8)

1-r s =
1-r

cs

= Ar

s

= number of soak days

AD

A term D is then introduced into the equation of the
catch from traps.

A being embodied in the constant term

of the r egression.
No value of r is available for Puerto Rico but since
r is f airly constant (between .874 and .901)

2

whatever

the Caribbean island studied, it was decided to use an
average r

=.884.

In addition, the assumption is made

that t h e fishermen go at sea at a constant rythm during
the y e a r, at least during the months for which catch from

1

J.L. Munro. The Mode of Operation of Antillan Fish Traps,
and the Relationship Between Ingress, Escapement, Catch and
~·
Fisheries Ecology Research Project, (Kingston, Jamaica,
University of West Indies, Port Royal Marine Laboratory,
Prepr int.
2

~.

I

P• 16.
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traps was reported.

For instance, if a fisherman had 100

tickets for 10 months of the year, and no sale tickets for
the rest of the year, it is assumed that he went fishing
regularly every three days during those ten months, and
no t

at all the two other months.

This could at best be

an approximation but it is the only way to estimate the
number of soak days per trap.

Personal observation and

d i sc u ss ions with the fishermen suggested that no more
t h a n 6 0 traps are lifted on an average day.

From this,

the following regression is computed:

where LXl = natural logarithm of the annual catch in pounds.
C = constant
othe r symbols are the natural logarithm of
LB =
LH =
LV =
LTT'=

length of the boat
number of man days at sea used in a year
number of gallons of gasoline used in a year
maximum number of traps which can be lifted
by one boat in one day
TT'= 60 if the fishermen owns more than 60 traps,
otherwise TT' is the number of traps owned.
LD = soak factor, such that:

(5- 10) D = .884

(1-.884~)
(1-.884 )

with
(5 - ll)S

=

30 FM x TT"

60 x Tl

FM:

number of months for which sale tickets reporting
catch from traps are available.

Tl:

number of sale tickets reporting catch from traps
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TT"

60 if the fisherman owns less than 60 traps,
otherwise TT" is the total number of traps
owned.

This approach gave unsatisfactory results as shown
by equation (5-12) .
(5-12)

LXl = 2.254 + 1.158 LB+ 1.304 LH -0.078
(1.168) (0.414)
(0.169)
(0.058)
(1.929) (3.830)
(7.715)
(-1.338)
-0.091 LTT' -0.005 LD
(0.130)
(1.147)
(-0.700)
(-0.362)

0.912

F statistic (5.33) = 68.806

where
LXl =

nat~ral

logarithm of the catch in pounds

The other symbols are the natural logarithm of
LB
LH =
LV =
LTT'=

length of the boat
number of man days at sea in a year
number of gallons of gasoline used in a year
maximum number of traps which can be lifted by
one boat in one day
TT'= 60 if the fisherman owns more than 60 traps,
otherwise TT' is the number of traps owned
LD = soak factor
In this case one would have expected the coefficient of

the soak factor LD to be close to one;

in fact it turned

out to be insignificant as did the coefficient of LTT'.
Various explanations are possible.

The most obvious one

is that one or several of the assumptions on which the design of D is based are too unrealistic.

The second set of

objections to that approach lies in the difference between
Munro's experiment and the fishermen's practices.

Equation

(5-8) applies to traps which are laid in the same location.
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on the other hand, if a fisherman owns many traps he will
put them in quite different areas in order to spread the
various risks, risk of catching fish of course, but also
risk of having his traps stolen or lost.

Then, this beha-

vior is better accounted for by introducing in the regression a variable which represents the number of traps
owned as in the regressions of Table V-1-a.
III

Lines
The number of lines used during a fishing trip is

introduced as an independent variable to attempt to explain the catch from lines.

Interestingly, it is insigni-

ficant.
(5-13)

LX6 =-1.428 + 1.986 LB+ 0.736 LH -0.022 LV
(l.690) (0.554)
(0.050)
(0.090)
(-0.845) (3.581)
(8.115)
(-0.440)
-0.323 LL
(0.447)
(-0.722)

2
R = 0.864
LX6

F statistic (4.15) = 23.981

natural logarithm of the catch from lines in
pounds

Other symbols are the natural logarithm of
LB
LH
LV
LL

=
=
=
=

length of the boat
man days at sea
gallons of gasoline
lines used each trip
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This can be explained by examining the composition
of the sample.

Of the 20 fishermen who reported fishing

with lines, 11 use one line per man in the boat; 6 use
one line fewer than they have men in the boat; 3 use one
line more than they have men.

Equation (5-13) would indi-

cate that when one man in the boat does not fish but keeps
the boat steady, the other

members of the crew are able

to catch as much fish as the boats which have the same
number of men on board but where everyone is fishing.

On

the other hand, when one man attends more than one line he
is no more efficient than the crew using one line per man.
Understandably, it is a small sample and it is difficult
to argue that if the 6 boats using fewer lines than men or
the 3 boats using more lines than men operated exactly as
many lines as men they would be more or less efficient.
Probahly the combination lines-men chosen by each crew
corresponds to the characteristics of this particular crew,
and one suspects that the fishermen of each boat chose the
optimum combination in most cases.
IV

Measuring Labor
Labor is measured as the number of man days at sea.

The number of men in the boat is multiplied by the number
of days the boat went to sea.
In trap fishing as well as in line fishing, the coefficient of man days at sea during the year is highly signifi-
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cant.

This is not surprising since the dependent varia-

ble is the annual catch.

However, where the daily catch

is used as the dependent variable and the number of men
in the boat is the measure of labor input the coefficient
of the latter variable is significant for traps but not
f o r hand lines as shown by equations (5-14) and (5-15).
(5-14)

DLXl= -2.489 + 1.720 LB+ 0.587 LHD
(1.143) (0.417)
(0.261)
(-2.176) (4.118)
(2.224)

+ 0.009 LVD + 0.413 LTT
(0.048)
(0.198)
2

R

= 0.699

(0.101)
(4.080)

F statistic ( 4. 34) = 19. 819

The symbols are the natural logarithms of:
DLXl
LB
LHD
LVD
LTT

=
=
=
=

( 5-15)

daily catch from traps
length of the boat
men in the boat for each trip
gallons of gasoline per trip
traps owned
DLX = -2.866 + 2.401 LB -0.518 LHD
(0.449)
(1.742) (0.592)
(-1.644) (4.052)
(-1.153)
-0.043 LVD
(0.054)
(-0.805)

2
R = 0.520

F statistic (3-16)

t . 15 = 1.071

F.Ol (3-16) = 5.29

5.799

DLX6= daily catch from lines
One would expect the number of men in the boat to be
a significant explanatory variable as far as catch from
traps are concerned.

Having two men instead of one will
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allow the placing of more traps in deeper water since
it will be easier for two men rather than just for one
to pull the traps.

When the effects of using a pot hau-

ler are investigated in the next chapter, it will be shown
that being able to pull the traps from deeper water is an
important factor.
As far as line fishing is concerned, the coefficient
of the labor variable would tend to be negative although
it is significant only at the 15% level.

This suggests

that given a fixed number of lines, having an extra man
to keep the boat still is not productive.

This already

appeared in equation (5-13) where it was shown that given
a fixed number of men in the boat it was just as productive to have everyone attend a line.

However, the same

caution is necessary here concerning the size and the
structure of the sample.
V

Role of the Fishing Grounds
No direct attempt was made to determine the effect on

the catch from fishing in the various fishing grounds.

Du-

ring the field interviews it appeared that the fishermen
often changed fishing grounds. In. addition, they were rare-

ly able (or willing) to state with precision where they
fished.

For these reasons another approach was substituted:

The fishermen were asked how many gallons of gasoline they
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used on each trip, on the average.

This was expected to

give an indication as to how far from their home port they
went fishing.

Since the dependent variable is the yearly

catch, the number of gallons of gasoline used on each
trip has been multiplied by the number of trips.

As shown

in Table V-1 the coefficient of that variable is not significant for trap fishing only at low degrees of confidence.
One of the reasons f or this comes from the difficulty for
the fishermen to give an accurate measure of the number of
gallons of gasoline used during one trip . During many interviews it seemed that the fishermen did not have a good
idea of this figure.

Futhermore,

discussions with a boat

dealer showed that, given a 16-foot boat of the type used
in Puerto Rico, a 6 HP. motor would consume 1 to 1/2 gallons
of gasoline in one hour at 4 .5 mph. while an 18 HP. motor
would consume 2 to 2-1/2 gallons in one hour at 10 mph .
In other

words, to go the same distance, the two motors

would use the same amount of gasoline providing that the
boat with a small motor goes at half the speed of the other
boat.

And even if they go the same distance at the same

speed the difference in consumption of gasoline is likely .
to be small.

This suggests that it is not such a good varia-

ble to estimate how far the fishermen g o fishing.

In addi-

tion, the small amount of gasoline involved explains why the
fishermen could not give a value which was precise enoug h
to be significant in the re g ression .
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Another variable was then introduced.

Instead of

using the number of gallons of gasoline, the average number of hours of a fishing trip was selected.

It was then

multiplied by the number of days at sea, giving the total
time spent at sea in a year;

the coefficient of the na-

tural logarithm of this value is revealed to be significant.
(5-16)

LXl = -1.989 + 1.365 LB+ 0.457 LH + 0.482 LI
(1.057) (0.399)
(0.211)
(0.206)
(-1.881) (3.417)
(2.163)
(2.337)
+ 0.392 LTT
(0.141)
(2.773)

2

R

= 0.929

(5-17) LX6

F statistic (4,34) = 112.375

=

-1.445 + 1.833 LB + 0.577 LH + 0.160 LI
(1.456) (0.482)
(0.085)
(0.072)
(-0.992) (3.800)
(6.785)
(2.208)

2
R = 0.892

F statistic (3,16)

=

44.042

When the daily catch was the dependent variable and
LID the natural logarithm of the daily length of the trip
the following results are obtained:
(5-18)

DLXl

= -2.197

(1.085)
(-2.025)

+

2

R

=

0.733

(5-19)

DLX6

0.444 LID + 0.356 LTT
(0.213)
(0.095)
(2.079)
(3.757)
F statistic (4,34)

= -2.683

(1.745)
(-1.537)

0.523

+ 1.446 LB + 0.331 LHD
(0.415)
(0.275)
(3.482)
(1.201)

=

23.384

+ 2.119 LB + 0.237 LID-0.237 LID
(0.651)
(0.276)
(0.476)
(3.256)
(0.857)
(-:0.708)

F statistic (3.16) = 5.857
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In equations (5-16) to (5-19)the symbols represent:
1)

Dependent variables, the natural logarithm of
LXl
DLXl
LX6
DLX6

2)

annual catch from traps
daily catch from traps
annual catch from lines
daily catch from lines

Independent variables, the natural logarithm of
LB
LH
LI
LTT
LHD
LID

length of the boat
man days at sea in a year
total time spent at sea in a year
traps owned
men in the boat for each trip
length of the daily trip (in hours)

In this case the daily catch from traps is signif icantly altered by the time spent at sea each day, independent of the number of traps owned.

This suggests that the

fishermen who spend the longest time at sea every day probably do so in order to reach more productive grounds,
either to the edge of the continental shelf or along the
coast but further from their port.
On the other hand, it is surprising to note that the
time spent fishing with hand lines does not help explain
the catch.

This phenomenon is to be paralleled with the

observation that many of the coefficients of other
variables which could be expected to influence the catch
were also not significant.

2

In fact, the R 's and F

statistics for the regressions dealing with the catch
from hand lines were constantly lower than the R2 's
and F statistics for the regressions dealing with the
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catch from traps.

These findings tend to emphasize a

characteristic of hand line fishing, that is, the
higher skill required from the fishermen.

When trap

fishing and hand line fishing were described earlier it
was mentioned that to be a successful hand line fisherman required that

the fisherman have a knowledge of

fish behavior and their feeding habits.

This is not as

important in trap fishing although it will be shown later
that the skill factor can also make a difference in the
catch from traps.

However, since no measure of the

fishermen's skill was introduced in the regression, if
it is an important factor in determining the catch, the
absence of this variable would explain the low R21 s and
F statistics as well as the lack of significance of the
coefficients of the other variables.

Subsequent find-

ings will be presented which tend to confirm this hypothesis.

II
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The Dependent Variable
Both trap and hand line fishing produce a mixed

species catch, in the case of traps primarily bottom
species and for hand lines bottom and midwater species.
Although some species are more valuable than others, there
is little or no opportunity for the fishermen to selectively fish, using these two techniques, for the higher
priced species.
On the contrary, if there are changes in the prices
from one port to another, their effects will be eliminated
by measuring the catch in pounds.

In fact, those varia-

tions are very small and the regressions are quite comparable whatever the unit in which the catch is measured.

Those

regressions are shown in Table V-2.
To conclude this chapter it is necessary to make a
remark concerning the missing sale tickets.
The Puerto Rican Department of Agriculture assumes
that the missing sale tickets represent 25 percent of the
fishermen's trips but also 25 percent of their catch.

Re-

gressions were computed after the catch and the number of
days at sea had been divided by .75.

The effect of this

transformation is to change the constant term as it can be
shown in a simple example.
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TABLE V-2
COMPARISONS OF REGRESSIONS USING POUNDS AND DOLLARS
TO MEASURE THE CATCH.
Traps

Lines

pounds

dollars

pounds

dollars

-2.106
(1.113
(-1.892)

-2.545
(1.070)
(-2.377)

-1.536
(1.658)
(-0.926)

-1. 701
(0.806)
(-1. 991

length
of the
boat

1. 646
(0.408)
(4.030)

1. 550
(0.392)
(3.947)

1.976
(0.546)
(3.619)

1. 805
(0.496)
(3.639)

man day s
at sea

0.729
(0.171)
(4.268)

1. 053
(0.164)
(6.407)

0.716
(0.085)
(8.419)

0.748
(0.077)
(9.679)

gallon s
of
gasolin e

0 . 070
(0.058)
(1.206)

-0.042
(0.055)
(-0.754)

-0.016
(0.048)
(-0.336)

-0.005
(0.044)
(-0.126)

traps
owned

0.538
(0.147)
(3.659)

0.253
(0.141)
(1.792)

Constant
Natura l
logari thm of

R2
F(4,3 4 }
F(3,16)

0.921
100.093

0.918
95.871

0.860

0.891

32.779

43.593

The first number in each group is the coefficient of the
variabl e .
The first number in parenthesis is the standard
error and the second is the t-statistic.
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Given a Cobb-Douglas type production function:

If some of the variables

(the catch and those which are a

multiple of the number of trips) are multiplied (or divided)
by a constant c.

Table V-3 shows the change in the constant term of the
regression when adjustments are introduced for the missing
sale tickets.
In fact, the constant term is only slightly changed;
this is because the sum of the coefficients of LH and LV is
close to one.

LH and LV are the independent variables which

were divided by .75 to adjust for the missing sale tickets.
This chapter shows that the boat and its motor are the
most important factors to explain the level of the catch from
hand lines and from traps.

The second significant indepen-

dent variable is the number of man days at sea.

In fact,

those two elements are the only ones which were found to
be significant to explain the catch from lines.

To explain

the catch from traps, the number of traps owned is also
an important explanatory variable.
Among the variables which might have been important
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TABLE V- 3
CHANGES IN THE CONSTANT TERM OF THE REGRESSION
CORRECTED FOR THE MISSING SALE TICKETS.
(Catch in pounds.)
Lines

Traps
Before
adjustment

c

Natur al
logarithm of

- 2 . 106
(1.113)
(-1.892)

;:,fter
adjustment
-2.049
(1.113)
(-1.839)

Before
adjustment

After
adjustment

-1. 536
(1.658)
(-0.926)

-1. 450
(1.664)
(-0 . 871)

(The coefficients of the other variables are
the same before and after adjustment.)

length o f
boat

1. 646
(0.408)
(4.030)

1. 976
(0.546)
(3.619)

man da y s
at sea

0 . 729
(0.171)
(4.268)

0.716
(0 . 085)
(8.419)

gallons o f
gasoline

0.070
(0.058)
(1.206)

-0 . 016
(0.048)
(-0.336)

traps
owned

0.538
(0 . 147)
(3.659)

R2
F(4,34)
F(3,16)

0 . 921
100.093

0.860
32 . 779

The first number in each group is the coefficient of
the variable .
The first number in parenthesis is the
standar d error and the second number is the t-statistic.
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it must be noted that the number of gallons of gasoline
used in a year is not a good explanatory variable.
It is also interesting to recall the conclusion concerning the

rumber of men in the boat.

For trap fishing,

it was found that, everything else being equal, there was
a positive correlation between the number of men in the
boat and the size of the catch, however, for line fishing,
the number of men in the boat does not affect the catch.
Despite the various problems encountered in defining
and measuring several of the inputs, the results of the
regression are, in general, very significant, and they
provide a useful basis forfurther analysis of the fishermen's behavior.

VI

TESTS OF EFFICIENCY

Having estimated the catch functions for traps and
hand lines it is now possible to test for technical and
price efficiency.

For technical efficiency the test is

conducted as described in Chapter

IV.

A dummy variable

is introduced to measure the technical efficiency of one
group of boats as compared to the technical efficiency
of another.

Tests of price efficiency and comparisonsare

then conducted for the entire sample of fishermen, and
for various groups.

Finally a test is conducted to de-

termine if, given the present level of the other inputs,
it is profitable to invest in a winch.
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I

Technical Efficiency
The technical efficiency tests are based on the assurnp-

tion that for the same fishing methods all the boats have
the same catch function e x cept for one parameter which embodies the difference in technical efficiency.
The catch function has the general form
n
( 6-1)
a.LX.
LXl = c + cS s + L:
]_
]_
i=l
LXl

natural logarithm of the catch

LX.]_

natural logarithm of input level x.]_

Dummy variable:

s

s

=1
=0

i

= 1 ..... s

i

= s -1 . . . . . n

For this test the catch functions used were the same
as those described in Chapter V.
Various criteria were used to divide the sample of
boats in two groups, then, technical efficiency was compared between groups.
Division

I:

(1)
( 2)

motor less than or equal to 30 hp
motor over 30 hp.

Division

II:

( 1)
( 2)

motor less than or equal to 40 hp
motor over 40 hp.

Division III:

(1)
( 2)

fishermen using a winch
fishermen not using a winch

Division

IV:

( 1)
( 2)

fishermen fishing with traps only
fishermen fishing with lines and traps

Division

V:

( 1)
( 2)

fishermen fishing with lines only
fishermen fishing with lines and traps
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For each division a regression was computed where the
dependent variable was the annual catch, while the independent variables . were,
( 1) for the trap fishing operations:

( 2)

(a)

the length of the boat

(b)

the number of man-days at sea

(c)

the number of gallons of gasoline used in
one year

( d)

the number of traps owned

for the line fishing operations:
(a)

the length of the boat

(b)

the number of man days at sea

(c)

the number of gallons of gasoline used in
a year

In addition in each regression a dummy variable was
introduced such that:
First regression, Division I:
S - 0 if motor < · 30 HP
S = 1 if motor > 30 HP
Second regression, Division II:
S - 0 if motor < 40 HP
S - 1 if motor > 40 HP
Third regression, Division III:
S

=0

if the boat is not equipped with a winch

S = 1 if the boat is equipped with a winch
Fourth regression, Division IV:
S - 0 if the fishermen fish with traps only

132
S

=1

if the fishermen fish with traps and hand lines

Fifth regression, Division V:
S = 0 if the fishermen fish with lines only
S - 1 if the fishermen fish with traps and lines.
The coefficient of S obtained in the successive regression
is presented in Table VI-1.
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TABLE VI-1
TESTS OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
(Using the length of the boat
as an independent variable.)

Division I

motor > 30 hp
motor < 30 hp

Division II

motor > 40 hp
motor < 40 hp

Division III

boats equipped
with a winch
boats without a
winch

Trap
fishing

Line
fishing

0.103
(0.278)
(0.371)

0.771
(0.712)
(0.999)

0.154
(0.394)
(0. 391)

0.317
(0.725)
(0.437)

0.476
(0.217)
(2.196)

Division IV and Division v
fishermen fishing
with traps and
lines

1
2

1
0.565
(0.213)
(2.647)

2
0.011
(0.546)
(0.021)

Compared to the fishermen fishing with traps only.
Compared to the fishermen fishing with hand lines only.

The first number in each group is the coefficient of
the dummy variable. The first number in parenthesis is
the standard error and the second number is the t-statistic.
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I

Big Boats and Small Boats
The first important finding is the non-significance

of the coefficient of the dummy variable for powerful
boats.

This is the case for fishermen using either traps

or hand lines.

It is also true whether the boats are

divided on the basis of motors more or less powerful than
30HP or more or less powerful than 40HP.

This means that

there is no significant difference between the technical
ability of the captains of big boats and the technical
ability of the captains of small boats.

As shown in Chap-

ter V the size of the boat is an important factor to explain the

size of the catch but what Table VI-1 indica-

tes is that, given the same equipment, the captains of
big boats will have the same catch as the captains of
small boats.
II

Traps and Lines as a Combined Enterprise
On the other hand, this is not the case if the trap

fishermen are divided between those fishing with traps
only and those fishing with both traps and lines.

The

fishermen practicing both methods are on the average more
technically efficient than the fishermen using traps only.
In the preceding chapter it was suggested that skill could
be an important element in explaining the catch from lines.
This is now reinforced by the estimates
VI-1.

given in Table

This shows that, all other inputs being equal, the
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fishermen who fish with lines and traps catch more fish
in their traps.

This is not a surprising finding.

It

is usually recognized that line fishing requires better
knowledge of fish behavior.

In this study it appears

that the fishermen who have this knowledge use it to improve the catch from traps.

It is not possible to tell

if this knowledge is acquired through the practice of line
fishing or if the fishermen decide to fish with lines because they already know the fish's behavior.

Whatever the

answer, this result emphasizes the importance of the skill
as an input factor.

Everything else being equal, the fish-

ermen using both traps and lines, on the average, catch
77 percent more than the fishermen using traps only.
When the line fishermen are divided into two groups,
those using lines only and those using lines and traps, it
appears that there is no significant difference of skill
between those groups.

This means that trap fishing does

not require any special knowledge nor does it teach anything that is not already necessary for line fishing.
III

Efficiency of a Winch
If the trap fishermen are divided between those using

a winch and those using a winch, Table VI-1 shows that the
coefficient of the dummy variable representing the winch is
significantly positive.

However, the coefficient of the

dummy variable is more difficult to interpret.

To a large

extent it measure s t h e e ffects of the winch itsel f .
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Yet it is conceivable that some fishermen decided to buy
a winch because they had chosen to fish in more productive and deeper grounds.

If this is so the coefficient

of the dummy variable reflects both the effects of the
winch and the technical efficiency of the captains.

For

these reasons it is not surprising to find that using a
winch makes a significant difference in the catch (61 percent) .

In Chapter V it was shown that the number of men

in the boat was significant, that is, the more power there
was to pull the traps, the larger the catch.

The positive

coefficient of the dummy variable associated with the
winch confirms this finding.

The fishermen using pot hau-

lers can lay the traps at greater depths.

This gives them a

larger choice of fishing grounds and therefore they can
fish the more profitable deeper waters.
Despite the fact that the use of a winch makes a significant difference, this does not mean that it is profitable to own one.

The added cost may not be compensated

by the increase in the catch.

This will be tested in the

last section.
In addition,

the last criteria can be used in combina-

tion to account at the same time for the fishermen who fish
with traps and lines as well as for the fishermen who use
a winch.

In this case the following regression was obtained.
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LPRl = -1.285 + 0.395 Q + 0.274 W + 0.793 LB +l.190 LH
(0.206)
(0.206)
(0.156)
(0.156)
(l.916)
(l.384)
(7.622)
(7.622)

( 6-3)

-0.077 LV + 0.332 LTT
(0.055)
(0.139)
(-1.399)
(2.394)
2

R

8

F statistic (6,32) = 68.288

= 0.929

00

= 0.4738

LP Rl = natural logarithm of the total revenue from traps
(in dollars)
=l
Q =O
w =l
w =0
Q

the
the
the
the

when
when
when
when

fisherman fishes with traps and lines
fisherman fishes with traps only
boat is equipped with a winch
boat is not equipped with a winch

The other variables are the natural logarithm of
LB
LH
LV
LTT

=
=
=
=

length
number
number
number

of
of
of
of

the boat
man days at sea in a year
gallons of gasoline used in a year
traps owned

Equati o n ( 6-3) shows that, even when measured concurrently,
the e ffects of fishing with traps and lines and using a
winch can alter the regression equation.

However in this

case the effect of the winch is not as important as before.
This tends to confirm that, in fact, when the efficiency
of us ing a winch is tested independently, two elements
are me asured, the effect of the winch itself and the captain's efficiency.

Here the captain's efficiency is already

partly embodied in Q.
B)

Test of technical efficiency when the input boat-

motor i s measured in monetary terms.

138
The ave rage power of the boat, the average price of a

horsepower and the value of the dummy variable when the
present value of the boat and of the motor is used to
measure the combined input boat-motor are shown in Table
VI-2.
The technical efficiencies which were proven to be
signific antly different earlier are confirmed to be so in
Table VI- 2 .

But a significant difference between more

powerfu l b o ats and less powerful boats appears here.

It

means t hat everything else being equal, per dollar of present valu e of boat and motor, the captains of the big boats
catch mo re fish.

This can be explained when comparing the

average cos t of one horsepower for each group.

The cap-

tains o f the mo re powerful boats get more power per dollar
than do t h e captains of the less powerful boats.

For this

reason, f or the same value of boat and motor they have a
bigger ca t c h, since there is a positive correlation between
catch and p ower (See Table V-1) .
In this case, the dummy variable does not measure
fishing a bility, it is only an effect of the cost structure.
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TABLE VI-2
TESTS OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
(U s ing the Present Value of the Boat and
the Motor as an Independent Variable)
Trap Fishing
Average
power of
the motor

Average
price of
one hp.

Dummy
variable

In HP

In $

60.42

11 . 79

< 3 0 HP

15.26

38.79

Cl.590}

DIVISION II
motor > 4 0 HP

80.83

4 . 84

< 4 O HP

19 . 76

35 . 15

0.687
. -0.277
(2. 4 7 6 l

50.82

21. 31

19.65

34 . 25

47 . 90

16.76

DIVISION I
motor > 3 0 HP
motor

motor

DIVISION II I
boats with winch
· boa ts without winch
DIVISION IV and
DIVISION V
fisher me n fishing
with tra p s & lines

0.418

co. 263 l

0.698

co .19 5)
(3.579)

1
0.630
(0.2161
(2.913)

-------------------------------------------------------------fishermen f is hing
with t r a ps only

22.60

34.95

f is~ermen fishing

with lines only
l

Compared to fishermen fishing with traps only.
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TABLE VI-2

(continued)

TESTS OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
(Using the Present Value of the Boat and
the Motor as an Independent Variable)
Line Fishing
Average
power of
the motor
In HP
DIVISION I
motor > 30 HP

75.2

Average
price of
one hp.

Dummy
variable

In $

5.65

motor < 30 HP

19.00

31.28

DIVISION II
motor > 40 HP

84.00

2.38

motor < 40 HP

20.31

36.49

47.90

16.76

1. 4 37
( 0 . 4 51)
(3.185)
1. 658
(_0.501)
(3. 3 0 5)

DIVISION III
boats with winch
boats without winch
DIVISION IV and
DIVISION V
fishermen fishing
with traps & lines

0.604
(_0.6131
(0.985)

2

-------------- ------~------------------------~~---------------

fishermen fishing
with traps only

fishermen fishing
with lines only
2

18.36

32.48

Compared to fishermen fishing with lines only.
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II

Price Efficiency
In this section, tests are conducted to determine if

the fishermen are price efficient, that is to see if they
choose the optimum combinations of inputs, given the set
of prices and the technical coefficients:
Equation (4-40) gave:
n

E

l/n

i=l

(ln X . - ln X .)+ln p -ln p - 1/28 +ln 3/2=R
qi
oi
o
q
oo
+ ln a
Ch~pter

As mentioned in

IV , because of the statis-

tical distribution of the left hand side of equation (4-40)
as well as of log ( a ) it was not possible to conduct a
q

statistical test to compare those two terms.

For this

reason some caution will be necessary when interpreting
the results.
I

Trap Fishing
a)

Price efficiency of the investment in the boat

and the motor.
When testing for the price efficiency of investment
in boat and motor for the 39 fishermen fishing with traps
equation (4-40) becomes:
39
1/39 E
{-lnX .+lnB . -lnp +lnpB}-1/28
+ln(y-1)=
i=l
oi
i
o
oo

(6-4)

Where each symbol is
X0 i

catch in pounds

Bi

length of the boat

P0

price of a pound of fish
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PB price of one foot of boat
8

standard error of the regression using the same
variables
y crew's share under the lay system
RB disturbance term accounting for possible price
inefficiency

00

a B coefficient of lnB in the regression
Note that:
LX Ol. +lnp 0

=

LPRl.l

where PRl is the total catch in dollars
and
lnBi + lnpB is the cost of the boat.
Consequently it is possible to write equation (6-4);
3S

( 6-5)

1/39

E

. 1

i-

(LDT. - LPR1 ) - 1/2 6
+ ln (3/2)
1
l
00

LPRI .

natural logarithm of the total revenue from
trap fishing

LDT.

natural logarithm of the depreciation of the
boat and motor plus maintenance imputed to
trap fishing:

l

l

This share DT for trap fishing is equal to:
DT=TDlxZl
TD total depreciation on the boat and motor plus
maintenance
Zl proportion of the total revenue stemming from traps
Computing equation (6-5) gives:
39
(6-5a)
1/39 E
(LDT i-LPRl) -1/2 0
+ ln ( 3/2) =1.1778
00
i=l
Where 0 00 is the standard error in the regression (6-6).
Total for price efficiency, the value of equation
(6-5a) must be compared to the coefficient of LDT in equation
(6-6).
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(6-6)

LPRl

=

-4.357 + 0.366 LTD + 1.146 LH + 0.110 LTT
(0.756) (0.168)
(0.151)
(0.057)
(-5.759) (2.174)
(7.582)
(2.747)
-0.058 LV + 0.398 Q + 0.435 w
(0.185)
(0. 221)
(0.052)
(2.344)
(1.797)
(-1.112)

The symbols are the same as in equation ( 6- 3)
The value of equation (6-5a): -1.177 is to be compared with ln(0.366)

=

-1.005.

In this case the difference

between the two values is small and does not allow the conclusion that the fishermen are not price efficient.
b)

Price efficiency of the investment in traps
To test if the fishermen are using the right number of

traps given their present level of the other inputs, the
following analysis was conducted.
(6-7) -1
39

39
l:

i=l

$20.00 is the expected cost of a trap.
trap is $16.

= -0.970

(LTT 1.. - LPRl.)
+ ln (20)+ ln(3/2)
1.

(1.266)

The price of a

On the whole island the fishermen lose 1/4 of

their traps every year.

For this reason the annual cost
5

of owning for instance, 100 traps is 100 x 16 x - = 100
4

x 20

= $2000.

(from equation (6-7) and using 8 00 = .0532

(from equation 6-6).

An important note should be added

concerning the price of the traps.
presently use steel framed traps.

Most of the fishermen
They usually buy the

frame already made and put the chicken wire around it themselves.

In that case the material costs them $16.

Using
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mangrove framed traps, the material is cheaper.

However,

the life of a mangrove framed trap is shorter than the
life of a steel framed one.

Consequently, it is reason-

able to estimate the expected annual cost of a trap at
regardless of the type of frame.
39
1
(_LTT.
LPR . }_ + ln c20 )_
l:
( 6-8)
l.
l
39 i=l

$20.

-

-

1/28

00

+ln(_3/2) =
-0.513

This is to be compared with the natural logarithm of the
coefficient of LTT in equation (6-6) ln (0.110) = -2.227.
The difference between those two numbers is sufficiently
large to conclude that, given the present level of the other
inputs, the fishermen are investing too much in traps.
II

Line Fishing
In this case the test of price efficiency was conduc-

ted for the input boat-motor only.

None of the other in-

puts, except labor, had a significant regression coefficient.
For this test the following regression was used:
(6-9)

LPR6=

2

R = 0.840

4.689+ 0.578 LDL+ 0.816 LH - 0.007 LV
(0.107)
(0.053)
(1.925) (0.288)
(7 .586)
(-0.131)
(2.435) (2.0011

F(3,16) =

28.131

8

00

=

0.527

Where LPR6 is the natural logarithm of the total revenue
from lines.

The cost of capital was computed in the same

fashion as for trap fishing.
(6-10)
DL

DL = TDxZ2

depreciation on the boat and the motor, plus maintenance imputed to line fishing.
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TD

total depreciation on the boat and the motor
plus maintenance.

It was noted in Chapter IV

that this motor of im-

puting cost was acceptable if the coefficients of capital
in the regressions were similar.

This is almost the

situation since for trap fishing the capital coefficient
is 0.366 while for hand line fishing it is 0.578.
From equation (6-9) ln (0.578)

=

-0.548, which

is to be compared with:
20
1
( 6-11)
L:
(ln DL -ln PR6) -1/2 8
+ln(3/2)
20 i=l
00

=

-1.679

In this case the difference between the two values
seems large enough to conclude safely that, given the present level of other inputs, the fishermen would increase
their profit if they had larger boats.

146
III

Comparison of the Price Efficiencies for Various
Groups of Fishermen
The fishermen were divided into groups according

to power of the motor, presence of a winch and those
using one method of fishing only compared to those fishing with both traps and lines.
For each division the following relationship was
computed:
I)

For trap fishing
A)

(6-12) 1
n

B)

(6-;L3);

Input boat-motor
n
l:

(ln DT. - ln PRl.)
l

i=l

l

-1/28 00 + ln(3/2) =6T

and traps
n
l:

(ln DT. - ln PRl.) -1/28
1

i=l

l

00

+ ln(3/2)

II) For line fishing
Input boat-motor
( 6-14 )

1 n
l:

n i=l

(ln DL. - ln PRl.) -1/28
l

l

00

+ ln(3/2) = 6 L

The result of those computations are summarized in
Table VI-3.
In Division IV the sample is divided between those
using both traps and lines and those using traps only.
In Division V, fishermen using both traps and lines are
compared to those fishing with lines only.

The analysis
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TABLE VI-3
COMPARISON OF PRICE EFFICIENCY BETWEEN GROUPS
OF FISHERMEN.
Line Fishing

Trap Fishing
Boat-motors
lna. = -1.005

Traps
lna. = -1. 099

8T
DIVISION I
motors > 30 hp
motors < 30 hp

DIVISION II
motors >40 hp
motors < 40 hp

DIVISION III
boats with
winch
bosts without
winch
DIVISION IV & V
Traps and lines
Traps only
Lines only

<P

Boat-motors
lna. = -0.5481
8L

-1. 622
(0.559)

-

.968
(1.132)

-2.328
(0.520)

-0.972
(1.007)

-0.303
(1.010)

-1. 462
(0.903)

-2.005
(0. 383)

-1.588
(0.334)

-2.683
(0.156)

-1.022
(0.927)

-0.311
(1.054)

-1.460
(0.873)

-1.666
(0.668)

-1.043
(0.861)

1.009
(0.958)

-0.313
(1.083)

-1.331
(1.060)

-0.820
(1.236)

-1.136
(0.912)

-0.431
(1.044)

-1. 708
(0.943

-1. 682
(0.860)
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of price efficiency is between groups within divisions
by computing

T,

tions

(6-13),

(6-12),

L and

~

(Table VI -3) as shown in equa-

(6-14).

Tests of hypothesis were conducted for
in each division.

Treating 1/2

00

T,

L and

~

as a constant, according

to the central limit theorem, the left hand sides of equations

(6-12),

(6-13) and

(6-14) have a distribution which

tends to be normal.
Null hypothesis

H :

Alternative hypothesis

H :
1

0

(6-15)
8

00

with n +n -2 degrees of
1 2
freedom

where
xl

average of sample 1

x2

average of sample 2

nl

size of sample 1

n2

size of sample 2

82 = nl sl + n2 s2
00
nl + n2 -2
82
1

variance of sample 1

82

variance of sample 2

2

Table VI-4 summarizes the results of the tests.
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TABLE VI-4
t-TESTS FOR COMPARING PRICE EFFICIENCY
AMONG GROUPS OF FISnERMEN.

Trap Fishing
Boats
t of GT

Traps
t of ¢

Line Fishing
Boats
to of eL

Division I

2.039

1.779

1.888

Division II

2.490

2.812

2.720*

Division III

1.846

1.949

Division IV

0.524

0.936

Division v

*reject null hypothesis at the 2.5% level.

0.061
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If 2.5 percent is chosen as the risk of type I error
the null hypothesis is rejected for the values of t marked (*).

At the 5 percent level the null hypothesis is al-

ways rejected except for groups IV and V.

This indicates

that the fishermen in the various groups behave quite
differently.
a)

Comparison between the levels of investment in

boat-motor.
Both in Divisions I and II the owners of small boats
seem to be more efficient when they invest in boat and
motor regardless of whether they fish with traps or with
lines.

This is an apparent conflict with the conclusions

of Section I.
In fact it is another effect of the cost structure
which was presented earlier in Table VI-2.
will explain the present situation.

An example

A fishermen using

an outboard motor of 40 hp may have invested too much
because such a motor cost him $900.

On the other hand,

a fisherman using a used inboard motor of 80 hp may
not have invested enough because such a motor cost him only
$200.

In such a case it may appear that the fishermen of

the big boats do not invest too much.

At the same time,

it is possible that, when all the fishermen are included
into one sample, the results show that more investment
should be undertaken.

In the extreme example proposed
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above this would suggest that the fishermen should invest
in p owerful inboard motors because they can buy them at
re latively lower prices.
b)

Comparison between the levels of investment in

t rap s.
In Table VI-4 it is also shown that there is a significant difference between the price efficiency of the owners
of s mall boats when they invest in traps.

Earlier it was

foun d that, as a whole, the fishermen had a tendency to have
too many traps but, as it appears now, this varies considerabl y among the groups within divisions.

In Table VI-3

it appears that the owners of boats with an engine over 30
hp ar e price efficient, while if the sub-group is limited
to the fishermen who have a boat with a motor over 40 hp
there is even a tendency to have too few traps.

This si-

gnificant difference between the positions of the various
groups o f fishermen is probably due to the fact that the
fishermen tend to fix the number of their traps according
to the c o mmon amount of traps owned by the

other fisher-

men i n their community rather than according to their real
needs.
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IV

Investing in an Winch
When testing for the technical efficiency of a winch

the catch function for firm i had the form:

s = 1 if the fisherman used a winch
s =

0 if the fisherman did not use a winch

=

or (6-17) Xl.1.

A. en

BC:l

ttC:2

vC:3

1.

1.

1.

1.

TTC:

u

4

e

1.

01.

The expression of the expected profit can be stated:
a4
al a2 a3
n
E (TT) = Po A.e B.
H.
v.
TT.
1.
1.
1.
1.
1.

(6-18)

-p

T

TT.-1/3
1.

1/28

00

-p -DT.-p Vi
w 1. v
a4 u
oi
TT.
e

e

n al a2
B.
H.
(po A.e
1.
1.
1.

a3
v.
1.

1.

-p v.)
v 1.

whe re

p

0

price of one pound of fish

P w P rice of the winch
DT depreciation on boat and motor imputed to trap
fishing
P price of gasoline
v

PT price of a trap
1/3 (p A enBC: 1 ttC: 2
0

1.

1.

vC:3 TTC:4 euoi -p v.)
1.

1.

v

1.

price of

labor according to the lay system.
If the expected profit is to be maximized, the first
orde r condition to invest in an optimum size winch is:
( 6-19 )

dE

(TT)

a

e

i

p

=

o
(3/2)e

Xl.

e
1/2<1
i

n
00
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or ex-post,
(6-20)

ln p

0

+ ln Xl .-ln(3/2)-l/2 8
l

00

+ n = ln p

W

+ u.

lO

For the group of 11 fishermen fishing with winches
equation (6-18) becomes
11
1
l:
(ln p + ln Xl. - ln(3/2)+1/28 )+n
(6-21)
0
l
00
11 i=l

=

8.005

from which
8.005
e

=

1488

This means that as long as the pot hauler costs less
than $1488, the fishermen who use one are justified in doing
so.

The prices of the pot haulers used by the Puerto Rican

fishermen were not recorded during the interview.

However,

mechanical pot haulers are available in Puerto Rico at a
price of less than $500.
To conclude this chapter it is important to emphasize
the difference in technical efficiency between the fishermen
fishing both with traps and hand lines.

It should also be

noted that the captains of the larger, more powerful boats
are not more technically efficient than the captains of the
smaller boats.
Among the fishermen exclusively trap fishermen exclusively trap fishing a sizeable difference in their catch
was recorded when they use a winch.
The meaning of the tests of price efficiency should
also be recalled.

They indicate whether the fishermen per-

ceive the prices of the inputs correctly.

When it is found
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that the fishermen invest too much or too little in one
input it is always given the level of the other inputs.
In this chapter it was determined, that with that constraint, in general, the fishermen invest too much in
traps and not enough in boats and motors.

This means

that they perceive the price of the traps as lower than
it really is and the price of the combination boat-motor
as higher that it really is.

Yet, when maximizing pro-

fit with all levels of inputs variables, it may be found
that bigger and more powerful boats are needed, and it
could happen that the number of traps presently owned is
optimum, for those larger boats.

But this would be an

accident.
The results of this chapter suggest that the Puerto
Rican fishermen have a poor idea of the real prices of
the inputs especially boats and traps they are using.

In

the absence of any other action their returns could be improved if they acquired a better notion of those prices.

VII

SOME POLICY SUGGESTIONS TO INCREASE THE
INCOME OF THE PUERTO RICAN FISHERMEN
Chapters V and VI provided a structural and a be-

havioral description of trap and line fishing.

From the

findings of those two chapters, it is possible to suggest
policies for improving the economic situation of the fishermen.
Before considering policy alternatives this chapter
first describes more fully the present economic situation
of the fishermen, and then develops a model suitable for
evaluating policy measures.
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The Present Economic Performance
The total value of the annual catch, the return to

the captain and the crew, and the return on the present
value of the boat plus motor by various motor sizes and
equipment types for trap fishermen are given in Table
VII-1.

Similar information for line fishermen is presen-

ted in Table VII-2.
1)

The total annual catch is measured in dollars TR

2)

The total annual return to the captain, TRC, includes his profit plus his return on capital and
on labor and management.
It is what he has left
after he has paid all his fixed and variable
costs.

(7-1)

TRC

=

TR - Depreciation - maintenance - crew's sharecost of gasoline - cost of the traps (or cost
of the lines)

The depreciation in this case is the straight line
depreciation on the boat, the motor, and the winch.
3)

Annual net income to the captain

This was computed by subtracting from the total annual
return the interest the captain pays on his boat and motor.
An interest of 5 percent was used because it is the cost
Of capital to the fishermen taking loans from the Puerto
Rican Department of Agriculture.
This represents the return to the captain's labor,
management and profit.

4)
(7-2) CS
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The annual crew's share CS, is equal to:

= 1/3

(TR - cost of gasoline)

This is the most common way of remunerating the crew, although there are other systems.
5)

The average annual return on the present value of

2
the boat and the motor is computed as follows:
TR - D - M - 2 CS - V - T
r =
( 7-3)
PE+ PB
TR
D
M

2CS

v
T
PE
PB

total revenue
depreciation on the boat, the motor, and the winch
maintenance
In this way the captain's
twice the crew's share.
labor is remunerated as much as his crew's
cost of gasoline
cost of the traps or the lines
present value of the motor
present value of the boat

In order to compute this return it was necessary to
arbitrarily assign a value to the captain's labor.

By

deciding to give him the same remuneration as his crew, it
provided a basis to compare the rate of return r to the
interest rate the captain has to pay.
imputation if

With this kind of

r>5 percent the captain is financially better

off than his crew, but if r <5 percent the captain would make
more money being a deckhand provided that there is only one
deckhand in addition to the captain.

Note that the same

conclusion can be reached by comparing the captain's net
income to his crew's share.
If a fisherman is involved in both trap and line fishing, the returns are computed for each activity.

The va-
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lues are calculated for each of the activities according to
the relative contribution to the total revenue.

If a fish-

erman derives 10 percent of his total revenue from line
fishing and 90 percent from trap fishing, when computing
the return on the boat and motor from line fishing, only 10
percent of the total depreciation 10 percent of the maintenance, and 10 percent of the sum of the present value of the
boat and motor are included.
It appears in Tables VII-1 and VII-2 that the more
powerful boats yield higher returns and the highest returns
are obtained when fishing with lines rather than with traps.
Actually, when fishing with traps, only the boats having a
motor over 40 HP, and the boats equipped with a winch yield
positive returns on the _present value of boat plus motor.
The boats equipped with an engine between 30 and 40 HP have
very low returns.

In fact in this case, the captain's net

annual income is only about half of the crew's share.

In

most cases when fishing with traps the net annual income
of the captain is lower than the crew's share precisely because of the negative returns on boat and motors.
When fishing with lines all the returns on boat and
motor are positive.

The difference in the returns on boat

and motor between lines and traps can be explained by the
fact that trap fishing requires a higher level of investment, and this is further accentuated by the fact that
given the present prices and catch rates the fishermen have
overinvested in traps.
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TABLE VII-1
ECONOMIC RETURNS TO THE TRAP FISHING
OPERATIONS IN 1972
Total
value
of
annual
catch

Total
annual
return
to
captain

In $

In $

All traps

5575
1
(97 2 6)

1750
(3252)

Traps & lines

9978
(9987)

4519
(52 9 2)

Traps only

4402
(4705)

Motor > 30 HP

Net
annual
income
of the
captains

In $
1684
(_3216)

Annual
crew's
share

In $

Annual
return on
the present
value of
boat and
motor
In %

1696
(2019)

-45
(1.4184)

4419
(5222)

3144
(3178)

-19
(2.2892)

1011
l2013 l

954
l20 00)

1310
(14 2 6)

-52
(1.1308)

10854
(13756)

3917
(4544)

3795
(4509)

3300
(2521)

-21
(1.9614)

Motor < 30 HP

3139
(37971

749
Cl8 09)

709
Cl 7 9 9 l

956
(1198)

-56
Cl.1157)

Motor > 40 HP

14506
(7 58 8)

6645
(_4451)

6483
(_4 4 3 7 l

4502
(2545)

87
Cl. 0508)

Motor < 40 HP
-

2662
(3 64 3)

832
(_198 0}

784
Cl9 6 9)

1170
(1419)

-70
Cl.3439)

Boats with a
winch

10365
(8 5 7 7)

3943
(4755)

3830
(4711)

3229
(27 05)

2
(1.3721)

Boats without
a winch

3571
(_4073)

845
(1833)

799
(_18 21)

1057
(124 0)

-63
(1. 37 21)

30 HP < motor
<
40 HP

7203
(6923)

1189
(_2 7 8 4)

1108
(277 5)

2098
(2 010)

-242
Cl. 28 06)

Source:

Field Survey of 39 fishermen, 1973-74 and Department
of Agriculture sale tickets for the period.
1

The numbers in parenthesis are the standard error
of the variables in their respective samples.
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TABLE VII-2
ECONOMIC RETURNS TO THE LINE FISHING
OPERATIONS IN 1972

All lines
Trap s & lines
Lines only
Motor > 3 0 HP
Motor < 30 HP
Motor > 40 HP
Motor < 40 HP

Sourc e :

Annual
return on
the present
value of
boat and
motor

Total
annual
return
to
captain

In $

In $

In $

1550
(1367)1

471
(818)

4 51
(813)

355
( 4 24)

30
(1.5281)

7 29
(7 29)

123
(62 9)

118
(623)

114
(3 2 6)

15
(1.7864)

2212
(1415)

627
(1038)

599
(1036)

477
(514)

52
(1.3372)

1045
(8 01)

471
(445)

458
( 4 3 6)

311
(254)

101
(0.8871)

1718
(14 94 l

(9 22)

449
(918)

(4 7 5)

(1.6452

1118
(9 05)

(_5 0 2 l

503
( 49 0)

327
(281)

123
(0.8460)

1658
(14 63)

(8 9 2)

438
(8 8 8)

(4 60)

471
514
460

Net
annual
income
of the
captains

Annual
crew's
share

Total
value
of
annual
catch

In $

369

362

In %

7

7

(1.5895)

Field Survey of 20 fishermen, 1973-74 and Department of Agriculture sale tickets for the period.
1 The number in parenthesis is the standard error
of the variables in their respective samples.
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TABLE

VII-3

ECONOMIC RETURNS TO THE FISHERMEN USING
BOTH TRAPS AND LINES IN 1972

Annual Catch

Source:

$10707

Total annual returns to
the captain

$4633

Annual net income to the
captain:

$4548

Annual crew's share:

$3259

Annual return on present
value of the boat and
motor

-18.1 percent

Field survey of 9 fishermen, 1973-74 and Department
of Agriculture's Sale Tickets for the same period.

II
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Use of the Model for Policy Development
In Chapter V and Chapter VI the estimated catch func-

tions were given as:
Q
(7-5)
xoi = A IT
q=l

a

xqiq

e

u oi

In Chapter IV however, it was shown that the full
expression of equation (7-5) was
a
Q
n
u
1
oi }
x q
(K M IT
x oi = {N* -b E
e
(7-6)
qi
q=l
i=l
u .
a
Q
x qi
9 e Ol
K M IT
q=l
When estimating the catch functions at a single point
in time A was a constant.

For the purpose of policy de-

velopment it is not acceptable treatment of A.

Diffi-

culties arise since it is not possible given present knowledge of fish population dynamic to estimate the components
of A.

Neither N*, the maximum level that the population

could reach naturally, the coefficient b, nor the effects
of crowding externalities embodies in M are known.
Nevertheless, one important observation can be made
concerning the relationship expressed by equation (7-6)
which is useful for better estimating the effects of given
policies:

if A is not a constant any increase (decrease)

in the fishing power of the firms will have less (more)
effect on the catch than if A is treated as a constant.
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1) Change in the fishing power which does not effect
M directly.
If the fishermen's skill improves there will be no
direct effect on the crowding externalities.

However, the

catch will not increase by as much as i t would if A were
a constant.

as the fishing
The reason for this is that
Ct

.

1

pressure increases, b

n
L:

Q
(K M II

i=l
increase and this will lower A.

q=l

q

u

X . e
qi

.

oi) will also

Even in this case it is

possible that the economic position of the fishermen improves.

If this is so it is likely that new fishermen

will enter the fisheries which would directly affect M
through the crowding externalities, further reducing the
catch.
2) Change in fishing power which affect M directly.
This could happen if either the number of boats or
the number of traps were increased or if the fishermen went
to sea more often.

In this eventuality similar adjustments

as described above would take place.
Because it is difficult to forecast exactly the effects
of a policy decision, the findings presented in the following section serve only as an indication of the direction in
which the changes can be expected to occur.

In the absence

of better information on N*, b, and M, caution will be
necessary when formulating policy.

For instance, a size
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boat which would maximize profit if A were constant may
be too large because of the cumulative effects of all the
n

fishermen on stocks (through increase in
a
X 9 e
qi

Q

E
(K M TI
i=l
q=l

However, keeping those caveats in mind, it

is possible to suggest some policy directions for improving the economic situation of the Puerto Rican fishermen.
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Policy Direction:
Increasing technical

III

efficiency for the trap fishermen
For trap fishing it is possible to suggest some limited measures which would increase profit.

In addition,

one can make recommendations in order to attempt to maxirnize profit, which apply to line fishing as well.
In Chapter VI it was shown that the fishermen fishing
also with lines caught on the average 77 percent more fish
in their traps than the fishermen fishing with traps alone.
In addition, the fishermen who owned a winch caught 61 percent more fish.

When both factors were combined their in-

dividual effect was reduced but it was still significant.
Equation (6-3) gave:
L{E(PRl)}

=

-1. 285 + 0.395 Q + 0.274 W + 0.793 LB+
(1.126)
(0.206)
(0.198)
(0.428)
(-1.140)
(1.916)
(1.384)
(1.852)
-0.077 LV + 0.332 LTT+ ~(0.473)
(0.055)
(0.139)
(-1.399)
(2.394)

2

L{E(PRl)} natural logarithm of the expected value of the
total revenue from traps.
Q = 1 if the fishermen fishes with traps and lines
Q = 0
if the fisherman fishes with traps only
w = 1 if the boat is equipped with a winch
w 0 if the boat is not equipped with a winch

=

The other variables are the natural logarithm of
LB = length of the boat
LH = number of man days at sea
LV = number of gallons of gasoline used in a year
LTT
number of traps owned

=
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(0.4738)

being the standard error of the regression.
2
1/2(0.4738)
is the correcting term necessary to obtain the expected value L{E(PRl) }.
This suggests two actions which could be taken to
improve the income of the trap fishermen.

First is to

train the fishermen in order to improve their knowledge
of the fish behavior and second to equip all the boats
with a winch.
Some notions of the effects of these actions, under
the assumption of A constant (no stock externality) can be
seen from the following analysis.
The expected value of the total revenue from trap fishing is expressed by equation (7-7).

Equation (6-3) would

become:
(7-7) L{E(PRl)} = -0.615 + 0.793 LB+ 1.190 LH -0.077 LV+
(0.257) (0.428)
(0.156)
(0.055)
(-2.439) (1.852)
(7.622)
(-1.399)
0.332 LT+ ~(0.473)
(0.139)
(2.394)

2

The data in Table VII-4 gives some indication of the
average effect on the value of the catch and the returns if
equation (7-7) was the actual catch

function.

Since the

returns to the captain are what remains from total revenue
after payment for all variable and fixed inputs they are a
good measure of the fishermen's performance.

For this rea-

son the percentage increase in return to the captain, as
shown in the last column of Table VII-4, is a good indica-
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TABLE VII-4
POTENTIAL RETURNS TO THE TRAP FISHERMEN AFTER
ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND USING BOATS EQUIPPED
WITH A WINCH
Total
value of
annual
catch

In $

Net
annual
income
of the
captain
In $

In $
4077
(5018)

4011
(4982)

13405
(13297)

6779
(7498)

6779
(_7421)

Traps o nly

7977
(7530)

3357
(4001)

3300
(3986)

Motor > 30 HP

15984
(9282)

7315
C5568)

7194
(5527)

Motor < 3 0 HP
-

5952
(_7191)

2582
(4034)

2542
(4024)

Motor > 40 HP

21752
(_6886)

11467
(39 24)

11305
(_3932)

Motor

67 51
(_7392)

2691
(_3 8 7 3)

2644
(38 61)

13947
(_l 0 913)

6331
(_6295)

6218
(6240)

7036
(7 5 2 0)

3107
(_4123)

3061
(4108)

All traps
Trap s and lines

.s.

40 HP

Boats with a
winc h
Boats without
a winch
1

9120
1
(9106)

Total
annual
return to
captain

The n u mber in parenthesis is the standard error of the
variables in their respective samples.
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TABLE VII-4

(continued)

POTENTIAL RETURNS TO THE TRAP FISHERMEN AFTER
ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND USING BOATS EQUIPPED
WITH A WINCH
Annual
crew's
share

In $

Annual
return
on the
present
value of
boat and
motor

% Change
in captain's
return from
present
situation

In %

All traps

2878
l28 98 l

47
l2. 2 21)

Traps & lines

4287
l4275l

16
C3 .19 ol _

Trap s only

2502
l23 69 l

56
ll. 951)

232

Motor

> 30 HP

5010
(2 9 63)

55
(2.672)

87

Motor

< 30 HP

1894
(2319)

44
(2.039)

244

Motor

> 4 0 HP

6918
(2264 )_

202
Cl. 52 9)

73

Motor

< 4 0 HP

2120
(38731

18
(2.227)

224

Boats with a
wi n c h

4424
(34841

81
Cl.7141

61

Boa ts without
a winch

2212
(23831

35
(2 . 3 7 0 l

161

133
50
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tion of the magnitude of change which could be expected:
These are calculated as:

(7-8)

Potential Returns - Actual Returns x 100
Actual Returns

The values given in Table VII-4 must be interpreted
with caution.

They indicate only very roughly the level

which might be reached if the actions suggested above
were taken.

In addition, since the assumption regarding

A as a constant may not be fully satisfied, the computation itself adds to the need for a careful interpretation
of the results.

This is partly reflected in the relatively

large standard deviations of the estimates.

Despite these

limitations, if all the fishermen had the skill of the
fishermen who fish with lines and traps, and if all the
boats were equipped with a winch, i t is clear that economic performance would be increased.

This is demonstrated

by the estimates of the annual returns on the boat and the
motor given in Table VII-4 which are all positive, while,
in most cases, today they are negative.

Not surprisingly,

the biggest improvement is possible for the small boats.
Today few of them are equipped with a winch and most of
their owners fish only with traps.

As expected, the small-

est changes are for the boats which are already equipped
with a winch or for fishermen who currently fish with both
traps and lines.
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IV

Policy Directions for Both Trap s and Lines Fishermen

I

Improving price efficiency when investing in

traps.
In Section II of Chapter VI it was shown that, in
general, fishermen had a tendency to underestimate the
price of the traps although it was pointed out this
varied considerable between groups.
If the number of traps owned by the fishermen were
adapted to their actual needs, returns could also be
increased.

In order to demonstrate some of the effects

which could be expected from such a measure, the optimum
number of traps was computed for each fisherman given
his present level of the other inputs:

boat,

moto~

sence of a winch, and number of men days at sea.

pre-

Equation

(7-9) was obtained by maximizing profit for the number of
traps, keeping all other input levels constant.
(7-9)

L{E(TT)}

+0.274 W+0.793

=

1

1 - o.332

LB+l.190

{ln(0 .332) - 1.285 + 0.395 Q

LH - 0.077 LV - ln(20)-ln(3/2)+

~(0.473) 2 }
L{E(TT)
0.332

}

natural logarithm of the expected value of the
optimum number of traps given the present level
of the other inputs.
coefficient of the natural logarithm of the trap
factor in equation (7-7).

All the other coefficients are also from equation (7-7).

Q
Q

w

=
=

w=

if
if
if
if

1
0
1
0

the
the
the
the
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fisherman fishes with traps and lines
fisherman fishes with traps only
boat is equipped with a winch
boat is not equipped with a winch

The other symbols are the natural logarithms of:
LB length of the boat
LH number of man days at sea in a year
LV number of gallons of gasoline used in a year
20 expected price of a trap
-ln(3/2) is a term which already appeared when testing for
price efficiency and which stems from the existence of
the lay system
1/2(0.473)2 1/28
is the correcting term to obtain the
00
logarithm of the expected value of the
optimum number of traps.
L{E(TT)} was first computed for each fisherman.

Then

the natural logarithm of the expected value of the return
from traps was determined for each of them using equation
(7-10)
(7-10) L{E(PRl)}

=

1.285 + 0.395 Q + 0.274 W+0.793 LB+

1.190 LH - 0.077 LV + 0.332 L{E(TT)}+ 1/2(0.473)

2

From the value of L{E(PRl)} obtained for each fishermen E(PRl) was computed.

This allows calculation of the

measures used previously to estimate the performance of
the fishermen.

The average of those estimates for the

different groups are presented in Table VII-4.

In addition,

the geometric means of the optimum number of traps are
given for each group.

This allows a comparison with the

results of the test for price efficiency given in Chapter
VI.

For comparative purposes the percentage change in
return to the captain resulting from optimal investment
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in traps was also computed.
Table VII-5 shows that some substantial improvements
would be obtained if the fishermen used the proper number
of traps.

Although the potential changes in returns are

not as great as from increasing skill and using winches,
it appears that helping the fishermen to choose the correct
number of traps would increase their returns from fishing.
To that effect, equation (7-9) could be used as a guide.
Many factors specific to each fisherman will affect the
optimum number of traps he can handle.

In most cases, how-

ever, substantial deviation from the estimate obtained from
equation (7-9) should be corrected.
II

Maximizing Profit
In order to maximize profit fishermen must not only

choose the optimum level of variable inputs but they must
also operate an optimum size boat.

Practically this corres-

ponds to two different types of decisions.

In one case the

fisherman will consider his boat as a constraint and he will
want to invest in the number of traps which maximizes his
profit given his present boat.

In the second case, at other

time, he will want to change boat and choose one which will
maximize his profit, given some of his firm's characteristics
like the number of days he goes at sea.
situation which is discussed here.
this choice is

It is this kind of

The decision process for

ihe same for trap fishing and hand line fish-
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TABLE VII-5
POTENTIAL RETURNS TO THE TRAP FISHEffivlEN PROVIDED
THAT THEY USED THE OPTIMUM NUMBER OF TRAPS GIVEN
THE PRESENT LEVEL OF THE OTHER INPUTS
Total
value of
annual
catch

In $

Annual
crew's
share

In $

In $
2654
(4485)

8450
(13746)

2944
(.57 3 6)

2878
(.59 69)

Traps & lines

22725
(.24109)

9126
(10119}

9026
(10031)

4643
(_54 3 9)

1396
(1989}

1239
(1977)

7393
\ (7880)

'

'

\ 1390
CJ..684

Motor

> 30 HP

19668
(1944 0)

7217
(8505)

7 096
(8 4 64)

6238
(6435)

Motor

< 30 HP

3272
(_5008}

97 2
(2 013}

932
(2 006)

10001
(15 9 6\)

Motor

> 40 HP

33448
(_18 5 3 3)

13429
CB O5 6)

13268
(80361

10816
(617 4)

Motor

< 4 0 HP

37 62
(514 9}

978 .,
(1880)

930
(18 7 3)

1124
(1599)

19349
C209881

7340
(8 9 6 6)

7226
(8914)

6224
(6885)

3957
(52 6 9}

1143
l2 059}

1097
(2051 }_

1186
(164 7)

Boats with a
winc h

'

In $

Net
annual
income
of the
captain

All t r aps

Traps o nly

.

Total
annual
return to
captain

Boa ts without
a winc h
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TABLE VII - 5

(continued)

POTEN'I'IAL RETURNS TO THE TRAP FISHERMEN PROVIDED
THAT THEY USED THE OPTIMUM NUMB~l3,, OF TRAPS GIVEN
THE PRESENT LEVEL OF THK ::o7'HER INPUTS

Annual
return
on the
present
value of
boat and
motor

% change

in
captain's
return

present*
number
of
traps

optimum*
number
of
trap s

In %
Ai l t r a ps

4
(0 . 7818)

68

42.l

24.6

Trap s & lines

60
(1. 2 82 2)

102

43.2

39.8

28

41. 9

21.6

38
Cl.1411)

84

69 . 3

82.0

Motor < 3 0 HP

-11
(_0.5010)

30

33.5

14.0

Motot

> 40 HP

111
(l . 1272)

102

7 5. 7

Motor • < 40 HP

-15
(_0.50961

18

36.8

15.3

Boats with a
winc h

39
(_l. 18 9 7)

86

62.7

80.7

Boats without

9
(0 . 4940)

35

35.4

15 . 4

Tra'p s o nly
'

Motor > 3 0 HP
!

-10
(0 . 5215

305

*Geometric means
The number in parenthesis is the standard error of the
variables in their respective samples.
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ing, and therefore the following discussion applies equally

to both methods.
When investing in a boat and a motor the fishermen
usually have to choose between boat
and available at a given price.

types already built

For this reason, it is

more useful to provide the fishermen with an equation
which would allow them to decide if a given combination
of boat and motor is optimum for their operation.

A de-

mand equation would give the size of the theoretically
optimum boat.

Since the cost is not a linear function of

the number of feet of length, nor of the number of horsepower , this would not provide sufficient information for
decision making.

On the other hand, a guide by which to

judge given combination of boat and motor is more practical.
Consider the equation of the expected profit.

where
p

0

A
B
H
T
V
D
~

00

price of the fish
constant
length of the boat (as a measured of the combined
input boat and motor)
number of man days at sea in a year
number of traps owned
number of gallons of gasoline used during a year
annual cost of the boat (depreciation on the boat
and the motor and maintenance)
share under the lay system given to the crew
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pT

price of a trap

pv

price of a gallon of gasoline
Assuming that H is given, taking the first order con-

ditions, a boat is of optimum size if
(7-12)

1

ln{E(D)} =

where a.l

= lna.
l

If ln D is larger than the right hand side of the equation
the boat would be an over-investment;

if ln D is smaller

it would be an under-investment.
If the boat was to be used in more than one activity
lnD should be replaced by lnD+lnZ, where Z would be the
share of the activity studied in the total revenue.
Here too, it is necessary to recall the previous
notes of caution, that because of the effect of externalities these equations should only be considered as a guide.
In addition, in this study none of the boats were equipped
with echo sounders, radar, nor radio, all of which might
increase the productivity of a given boat.

To decide if

it is judicious to invest in a boat equipped with such
aids, simply by using equation (7-12) there could be
erroneous results.
It was shown earlier that the fishermen underinvested
in their boats, and that large boats with inboard motors
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were more profitable.

Despite these findings, before un-

dertaking any government program to increase boat size, it
must be kept in mind that large boats require more harbor
facilities, and these represent an added cost to the prograM. In the present study they are not.
Using the coefficients of equation (6-3), equation
(7-12) becomes:
(7-13)

ln{E(D)}

1
o. 7442

=

{lnp 0 -0.9379 + 0.3958 Q +

0.2743 W + 0.7938 LB + 1.1903 LH - 0.771
(-2.5770 - lnpT) + 0.3329

(1.10110-lnpv)}

Equation (7-13) can be used to test if a boat of a
certain size B with an annual depreciation of D will be an
optimum investment, provided the number of man days at sea
is H and p

0

is the average price of a pound of fish, pT the

price of a traps, and p v the price of a gallon of gasoline.
If the captain displays a skill comparable to those
who fish with both traps and lines or if he, himself+
fishes with traps and lines Q

=

1, otherwise Q

= Q.

If the boat is equipped with a winch W = 1, otherwise W = O.
Before closing this part of the section one important
note must be added.

It appeared in Chapter VI that the

catch increased with the size and the power of the boats
presumably because the larger, more powerful boats allow
the captains to fish at the edge of the continental shelf.
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The sub samples of powerful boats, however, were small;
there were only si x boats over 30 HP., and four over 40
HP., all of the latter from Puerto Real.

Suggesting that

more powerful boats will catch more fish implies that the
difference of productivity between the edge of the continental shelf and the closer fishing grounds is everywhere as significant as in Puerto Real.

There is present-

ly insufficient data to prove such an assumption. However,
the exploratory fishing and gear tests which have been
conducted off Puerto Rico suggest that the edge of the continental shelf is always more productive than the on-shore
grounds.
III

1

Chasing between trap fishing and line fishing
Comparing the information in Table VII-1 and Table

VII-2 it appears that, presently, line fishing gives the
higher return on the boat and the motor.

It should be

remembered however, that various measures could be taken
to improve the returns from both activities and particularly from trap fishing.

Consequently, it is difficult

to compare the potential returns from each activity and to
make recommendations as to the optimum combination between trap fishing and line fishing.
Despite those limitations, some remarks can be made

1E

'
'
.
sta d o Libre
Asociado
de Puerto Rico.
A Report on Exploratory Fishing and Gear Tests in Puerto Rico From 1969
to 1972 by Rolf Juhl.
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concerning a profitable combination.

In some areas the

choice must be limited because of the geographical conditions, but from many ports it is possible to fish with
traps and lines.

If the fishermen had the proper training

more could fish with lines.

For the fishermen who fish

only a few days a month it is certainly a more profitable
method than trap fishing because of the lower level of
investment required.
For the fishermen who fish more regularly, the present combination displayed by the more powerful boats seem
to be quite profitable as the returns in Table VII-1, Table
VII-2 and Table VII-3 show.
Whatever the potential returns this model could exhibit for both activities, it would be unwise to give up completely one method for the other.

In the present model the

fish population has been treated as homogeneous, but in
Chapter

II it was shown that the catch from lines did not

have the same species composition as the catch from traps.
Abandoning one method for the other, or even changing drastically the balance, would affect the fish population in
a way that would make the assumption of the model unacceptable and therefore would render the conclusions inaccurate.
Despite the various limitations due to the analytical
framework, or to the lack of information, this chapter
shows that many measures could be undertaken which would
improve the economic conditions of the Puerto Rican fisher-

men.
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Not all those measures would require higher invest-

ment.

The effects of a higher fishing skill would, for

instance be very significant.
Another measure which would have important financial
consequences for the fishermen concerns the price and the
life of the traps.

In Table VII-1 it was shown that in

1972 the average annual return to the captains fishing
with traps was $1750 while they owned an average of 44.2
traps

(Table II-7).

It is clear that if the price of the

traps could be reduced or their life lengthened it would
affect condiserably the captain's returns.
In addition, it should also be recalled that the number of days the fishermen go to sea is an important element
in the selection of the other inputs.

If the fishermen went

to sea more often, larger, more powerful boats would be justified.
Finally it is important to emphasize that the results
of this chapter indicated the direction of the changes which
can be expected if some policies are implemented.

They

should not be taken to represent exact magnitudes of those
changes.

CONCLUSION
This study should only be considered as the first
step of an economic analysis of the Puerto Rican artisanal fishery.

Much more research remains to be done. This

survey however, revealed some important facts concerning
the two most important fishing methods:
hand line.

trap fishing and

Although many of the results are not surprising

retrospectively, their confirmation provides the decision
makers with firm grounds on which to base their policy.
It was shown that it was possible to estimate catch
functions with a good level of precision.

Not surprising-

ly, the size and power of the boats turned out to be an
important element to explain the level of the catch. Where
trap fishing ·was concerned, the number of traps owned by
the fishermen and the number of men aboard were also significant factors to explain the catch.

For line fishing no

other input was found to have a significant influence on
the catch.

Comparing the regressions for catch from trap

fishing and catch from line fishing it appeared that the
former ones had higher R21 s and F statistics suggesting the
possibility that some input more important for line fishing than for trap fishing had been omitted from the equations.

The tests of technical efficiency revealed that
181
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fishing skill might be such an input, since they showed
that line fishermen were, as a whole, more skillful than
trap fishermen.
The tests of price efficiency showed that the fishermen were not price efficient.

They indicated that some-

what larger boats than the ones presently used would be
more profitable.

Concerning the optimum number of traps,

the tests also revealed that some fishermen underestimated
it while others overestimated it, depending upon the size
of their fishing operations.
The results of their tests led to policy recommendations.

Two kinds of measures should be taken.

It was de-

monstrated that improving the fishing skill of the fishermen and generalizing the use of a winch for trap fishermen
would considerably increase the catch.
At the same time, helping the fishermen choose the
optimum number of traps and the optimum size boats would
improve their profits.
All those results are important to anyone interested
in the development of the Puerto Rican fishery much more
remains to be done however, if a comprehensive management
program is to be drawn.
Many more studies could be undertaken to improve the
present one in order to provide information on economic
aspects which have been ignored here.
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For instance, it was not possible to evaluate with
precision the effects of the policy measures suggested by
the present analysis.

This was due to the lack of know-

ledge concerning the level and actual growth function of
the fish population and the crowding externalities, since
it is difficult to design a management program without
some knowledge of the fish population.
In addition, it is essential to know what the factors
are which motivate entrance into the fishing industry.

Pro-

fit is probably an important one, but the policy maker must
know the effect his decisions will have on the number of
persons who will enter into fishing.

This will require

analyzing the role of other factors outside fishery such
as the general level of employment or the demand for labor from the agricultural sector.

In this study, the num-

ber of days at sea was assumed constant.

In fact, it is

likely that an increase in the profit will encourage the
fishermen to fish more often and this will lead to an increase in the catch.

The policy maker should be aware of

that effect.
Finally, no global management scheme for fishery was
proposed.

This should, in the future, be an important area

of research.

The analysis of fish marketing in Puerto Rico

could also suggest important decisions to develop fishery.
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Much is still unknown of the economics of the Puerto
Rican fishery.

The points mentioned above are but a few

of the possible areas of research, and the results of the
present survey should encourage further study.

APPENDIX

I:

Data Collection and Field Method

The data used in the present study can be classified
in two categories according to their sources.

The catch

figures were obtained from the Puerto Rican Department of
Agriculture, which gathers these statistics from sale
tickets recorded on a fishing trip basis throughout the
year.

On the other hand the

type and quantity

information concerning the

of inputs used by the fishermen were

obtained through direct interviews.
An important point needs to be emphasized.

'I'he pur-

pose of this study being to analyze some of the production
processes in the fisheries rather than the economic situation of all the fishermen, it was decided to interview only
the captains of the boats in order to avoid including twice
the same firm in the sample.

(In the following the word

"fishermen" will refer to the captains unless otherwise
specified) .
The Commercial Fisheries Laboratory of the Department of Agriculture keeps lists of all the fishermen in
Puerto Rico.

The sample for Cabo Rojo was built by

choosing every third name on those lists.

Since the lists

were not set up in any particular order, this method was
in fact systematic random sampling.
185

However, it appeared
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that some of the fishermen selected in that fashion did
not report their catch to the Department of Agriculture.
Although, in the questionnaire, all the fishermen were
asked to estimate the value of their catch, those estimates turned out to be quite different from the catch
reported to the government.

This suggested that the

answer to that part of the questionnaire might not be
highly reliable.
The answers given in the questionnaires were constantly understated, they averaged $3693 against $6321
on the sale tickets for the same fishermen.

At the same

time the smaller standard error (1432) instead of (6270)
suggests that in the survey, the fishermen with the highest revenues tended to lower them to what they perceived
as closer to the community's average.
Consequently, if systematic random sampling was
used and if one was to discard the information given by
the fishermen who did not report their catch .:to the government, this could have reduced considerably the size of the
actual sample.

For that reason, it was decided to inter-

view, in the selected communities, all the fishermen for
whom the government had catch figures and to limit the
study to those fishermen.
A priori this method could have introduced a bias,
but, as it will be shown later, it is likely to be negligible since often the fact that his catch is recorded
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or not is independent of the fishermen.

This means the

recorded catches are not systematically the highest or
the lowest ones.

For all pratical purposes, it is possible

that whether a catch is reported or not may be a random
process.

For that reason it was thought that the risk

of introducing a slight bias was more than compensated for
by the fact that the information obtained in that fashion
was more reliable.

I

The Sale Tickets
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Since 1968 the Commercial Fisheries Laboratory of the
Puerto Rican Department of Agriculture has been gathering
statistics on the fisheries. 1

Under this program, the

Laboratory continuously keeps up to date a list of all the
fishermen of Puerto Rico.

In addition, the catches are

reported using sale tickets.

Every time a fishermen goes

at sea, a sale ticket is filled out, either by the fisherman himself or, more often, by the dealer who bought the
fish.

The slip is supposed to record the total catch in

weight and value.

In addition, it gives a breakdown of

the catch per species in weight and value and it indicates
the fishing method used to catch the fish.
Of all the informations given on the sale tickets the
breakdown by species is the least reliable.

The reason is

that, in reality, many sale tickets are not filled out
completely and, more often than not, only report the total
catch.

In addition, sometimes the fish are classified in

three groups according to their price per pound rather than
by species.

From that information the staff of the Labora-

tory divide the catch among the various species, according
to past experience.
In 1968 and 1969 the Department of Agriculture's projectattempted to collect sale tickets from all the Puerto

1

This project is conducted under the PL 88-309 Fishery
Research and Development Program.

Rican fishermen.
task.
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This turned out to be a very difficult

From 1970 on, the collection of sale tickets was

limited to the larger fishing communities.

It has been

estimated that those communities are responsible for 80
percent of the catch in Puerto Rico.
If a sale ticket

was in fact available every time

a fisherman of those communities went to sea, it would
provide not only an accurate estimate of the annual catch,
but it would also indicate
fishing in a year.
filled out, however;

how many days a fisherman goes

Sometimes the sale tickets are not
at other times the agents of the

laboratory fail to collect them.

Given these possible

mishaps, it is thought that the sale tickets are available
2
for only 75 percent of the fishing trips.
The limits of the sale tickets project suggest that
one must be careful when inferring annual figures or islandwide estimates from the information collected in that
fashion.

However, it seems that the sale tickets give good

estimates of the average daily catch.

This was confirmed

by personal observation of the way the tickets were filled
out by some of the dealers when the fishermen come back
from a fishing trip.

2

This is according to Dr. Suarez-Caabro Director of the
Commercial Fisheries Laboratory in Guanajibo, Puerto-Rico.
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II

The Questionnaire
Personal interviews of the fishermen constitute the

second source of information for this study.
naire was used to conduct the interviews.

A question-

Before devising

it, however, several fishing communities were visited and
informal conversations with the fishermen took place.
Then, a first draft was designed and translated into
Spanish by the Staff of the Laboratory.

With the help

of an employee of the Laboratory the first questionnaire
was field tested in Mayaguez.

This port was chosen for

pre-testing the questionnaires because it is not very
different from the type of community in which this survey
was to be applied.

Following this test, the questionnaire

was revised with the help of the staff of the Laboratory
and 41 interviews were then conducted in Cabo Rojo during
a first stay in Puerto Rico.

During a second stay other

interviews were conducted in other communities around the
island.
The interviews were all conducted with the help of
an interpreter.

The fishermen were usually cooperative.

Out of 70 fishermen contacted only two refused to answer.
The survey dealt with the fishing in 1972, but since the
interviews were conducted at first during the summer of
1973, and then during the winter of 1974, 19 of the fishermen who were listed in 1972 were not fishing anymore.
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Some had taken other jobs;
tinental United States.

others had moved to the con-

In general, there is no reason

to doubt the reliability of the answers given by the
fishermen except, as mentioned earlier, when they were
asked to evaluate the value of their annual catch.
All the answers concerning the equipment owned or
used are highly reliable.

Most of the time the inter-

views were conducted on the beach and often it was possible to observe directly that the information provided by
the fishermen was correct.
During the first stay in Puerto Rico, the study was
intended to address itself more specifically to the way
the fishermen allocated their resources between various
economic activities.

For this reason the year had been

divided into three periods and to some of the questions
the fishermen were expected to give an answer for each
period of the year.

This was the case for the number of

days at sea for example.

After analyzing the results of

the first part of the survey, when it appeared that few
fishermen had other economic activities, it was decided
to ignore this aspect of the problem.

Consequently,

during the second set of interviews the fis hermen were
asked to give only one aggregate answer for the whole
year 1972.
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